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A universal prescription drug coverage policy remains an unfinished business of Canadian 
healthcare system with over sixty year long historical roots. Since national medicare doesn’t 
provide prescription drugs outside of hospitals, provinces and territories have independently 
developed public drug insurance programs (primarily for seniors and the poorest on social 
assistance) under various eligibility and patient cost-sharing arrangements. The absence of 
universal public coverage inevitably created a large role for private financing of prescription drugs 
by means of a variety of costly private insurance plans and out-of-pocket payments that many 
Canadians cannot afford. This situation has by now driven the system to a crisis point where the 
phenomenon of fast-rising costs of medically necessary drugs has added further adverse effects on 
public health, in terms of reduced equity of access and lost socio-economic wellbeing. It costs the 
health system billions of dollars downstream by requiring additional visits to physicians and 
resulting hospitalizations as patient health conditions deteriorate due to cost-related non-adherence 
to prescriptions. In the past a number of attempts towards making a national pharmacare failed and 
the status quo with a confusing patchwork prevailed. Of late, the federal government has taken a 
sincere initiative to implement a universal drug coverage plan inclusive of some measure of user-
charge. This study evaluates the likely impact of different types of patient charges in a public 
system of prescription drug coverage for Canada. Employing qualitative and quantitative methods 
of analysis, it examines both primary and secondary data to evaluate the three policy options 
considered in this study. Taking all aspects into account, reasonable policy recommendations are 
made to make an affordable and efficient prescription drug coverage for all Canadians with the 
aim of reducing cost-related non-adherence to prescriptions, providing improved access to 
medications and, in the end, to achieve better health outcomes. 
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                                                        CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
As of now, prescription drug coverage in Canada relies on a patchwork system of 113 public plans 
and more than 100,000 private plans.1 This vast number of drug insurance plans, however, offers 
no ground for comfort. The Final Report of the Advisory Council on the Implementation of 
National Pharmacare, published in June 2019, discovered that despite numerous public and private 
plans “One in five Canadians [i.e., about 20% or 7.5 million] struggle to pay for their prescription 
medicines. Three million don’t fill their prescriptions because they can’t afford to. One million 
Canadians cut spending on food and heat to be able to afford their medicine. Many take out loans, 
even mortgage their homes. Sadly, far too many Canadians die prematurely or endure terrible 
suffering, illness or poor quality of life because modern medicines are out of reach for them.” 2   
The provincial drug plans have different criteria for reimbursement. Premiums, 
deductibles, copayments, co-insurance and maximum annual beneficiary contributions vary across 
the provinces and influence the magnitude of annual costs incurred by Canadian patients. A close 
review of four representative provincial models illustrates the complex patchwork character of 
pharmaceutical insurance and cost-sharing: (i) British Columbia’s family-income-based voluntary 
plan, (ii) Alberta’s premium-based voluntary plan (iii) Ontario’s age-based and income-tested 
voluntary plan, and (iv) Quebec’s premium-based employer-centered mandatory plans. Details of 
each provincial plan are shown in Appendix 1. 
 
1  Morgan, S. Evaluating National Pharmacare Options: Existing Policies Across Canada (a report 
prepared for the Advisory Council on the Implementation of National Pharmacare); cited in Health 
Canada, A Prescription for Canada: Achieving Pharmacare for All (Final Report of the Advisory 
Council on the Implementation of National Pharmacare (Ottawa: Health Canada, June 2019), 
Annex 4: pp. 134-5. 
2     Health Canada, A Prescription for Canada: Achieving Pharmacare for All, ibid., p. 7; 




Despite implementation by each province of a prescription drug coverage the latest national 
survey in October 2020 finds that the share of Canadians not filling or renewing their prescriptions 
due to cost concerns is rapidly rising.3 Whereas in 2019, one-in-five or 20% were not filling their 
prescriptions, in 2020 this figure rose to almost 25% or a quarter of all Canadians. In addition, 
more than two-in-five (44%) of Canadians are concerned about their ability to afford prescription 
drugs in 10 years. Only one-quarter (24%) felt very confident about being able to afford their 
prescription drugs.4 
        The idea of universal drug coverage, as a part of universal healthcare has long been debated 
in Canada. The Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada (2002), chaired by Roy 
J. Romanow recommended federal and provincial (and territorial) governments work together to 
cover prescription drugs within Medicare and adopt a long-term strategy of a "comprehensive 
drug coverage”. As a first step toward that goal, the Commission recommended, federal 
government make Catastrophic Drug Transfer (additional funds) to offset the cost of provincial 
and territorial drug plans to protect people from high drug-costs. It also recommended creating a 
national drug agency, a formulary, a new medication management program, and reviewing 
certain aspects of Canadian patent law.5    
The Romanow Commission argued that, when Medicare was first introduced in the 1960s, 
prescription drugs played a limited role in the healthcare system and in the day-to-day lives of the 
vast majority of Canadians. But the situation was different by 2002 as prescription drugs played a 
greater role. In the Commission’s view, given the expanding role of prescription drugs in Canada’s 
 
3            Angus Reid, ‘Access for all: Near Universal Support for a Pharmacare Plan Covering Canadian’s 
Prescription Drug Costs’. October 29, 2020; https://angusreid.org/pharmacare-2020/ 
4 
 
Angus Reid, ibid. 
5          Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, Building on Values: The Future of Health 





healthcare system, prescription drugs can be considered as medically necessary as hospital or 
physician services.6  
The Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology Report on 
the State of the Health Care System in Canada (2001-02), chaired by Senator Michael J.L. 
Kirby, looked at the federal role in healthcare, with special reference to the supply side, human 
resources and the need for greater competition, etc. On issues relating to prescription drug 
coverage, the Kirby Committee said that no Canadian should suffer undue financial hardship 
because of the cost of prescription drugs. It opined that the federal government should cover 90% 
of the cost. It also called for the federal government to work closely with provinces and territories 
to establish a single national formulary.7  
The Committee argued that the Canada Health Act does not preclude private insurers from 
supplementing provincial health care insurance plans.8 It proposed four possible options for a 
national pharmacare initiative  ̶  (i) a comprehensive public program (fully public), (ii) a 
comprehensive public/private initiative (partnership effort among the federal government, 
provincial governments and the private sector for providing coverage for all drug expenses),  (iii) 
public/private initiative to protect against high drug expenses (shared effort among the federal 
government, provincial governments and the private sector only against high drug costs) and (iv) 
tax initiative to protect against high drug expenses (Canadians receive a tax credit for ‘medically 
necessary’ prescription drug expenses above a threshold, e.g., above a certain percentage of 
income).9 However, in the sixth and final volume of the report it states that the Committee supports 
the five principles of the Canada Health Act and declares that none of its recommendations require 
any change to the Canada Health Act. 10    
 
6  Ibid., pp.189-190. 
7            Health Canada, A Prescription for Canada: Achieving Pharmacare for All, ibid., p.31. 
8  Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, Interim Report on the 
State of Health Care System in Canada (Chair Michael J. L. Kirby), vol.1, 2001, p.98. 
9  Ibid., vol. 4, pp.77-80. 




 Interestingly, of late, an encouraging level of consensus has emerged. In June 2019, the 
Advisory Council on the Implementation of national pharmacare recommended that “everyone in 
Canada should have access to prescription drugs based on their need and not their ability to pay, 
and delivered in a manner that is fair and sustainable.”11 This recommendation, especially the 
commitment to delivering public pharmacare in a “fair and sustainable” manner, underscores the 
urgency of the call for an affordable national prescription drug plan for Canadians. I have thereby 
formulated the research question as follows:  Should the federal government include a cost-sharing 
component in the proposed universal prescription drug coverage for Canada? 
        The research undertaken for this thesis essentially explores alternative theories and impacts 
of cost-sharing on prescription drug utilization. It analyzes both qualitative and quantitative data 
which help inform policy options aimed at implementing a universal public pharmacare and 
evaluate them on the basis of a set of criteria and measures. In the end, in light of the final analysis, 









Methodology of the Study 
 
 
This section states, in brief, the mixed methods employed in this research project. It provides a 
detailed review of the complex cost-sharing options in present prescription drug programs across 
Canada. It includes in-depth interviews with healthcare professionals and policy experts conducted 
between July 2020 and November 2020. The analysis of the interviews identifies major themes to 
address before formulating workable policy options on prescription drug insurance for Canada. It 
also includes a quantitative survey using SurveyMonkey conducted from October to December 
2020. Though the number of participants in the survey is modest, it represents a cross section of 
participants aware of the co-payment issues. It focused on some components of the prospective 
universal prescription drug policy and on the overall importance of such a policy compared to 
other public policy issues in Canada.   
I have used a semi-structured questionnaire providing necessary probes for each question 
asked in the qualitative interviews. The interviews have been conducted, of necessity, via email. I 
have conducted a thematic analysis using a data matrix for the qualitative study, in addition to 
subjecting the quantitative data to applicable analysis using Excel. I have maintained a codebook 
for thematic analysis and a qualitative conceptual framework.  
In doing the literature review, I used the SFU library database, Google Scholar, JSTOR (a 
scholarly journal storage), Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI), Statistics Canada, 
Health Canada, and all provincial and territorial websites for health and drug coverage details, as 
well as the websites of numerous think-tanks (e.g., Fraser Institute, C. D. Howe Institute, Institute 
for Research on Public Policy). In reviewing the literature, I used critical discourse analysis (CDA) 
as an analytical framework for studying connections between socio-political structures or nodes of 
power and ideologies expressed in the relevant literature. This required me to critically examine 
these reports within their historical, political, and socio-economic context. It has also been 




adopting and welcoming or, for that matter, resisting and blocking legislation and/or 
implementation of a particular public policy measure like the proposed universal pharmacare.  
The steps I have followed in the literature review process can be outlined as follows: 
• All relevant papers collected are listed using a spread sheet.  
• A general summary of each document has been written in a Word file. 
• A thorough analysis (taking all aspects of a particular paper into account) has been 
done.  



















Theories of Cost Sharing and their Effect on Public Health 
 
The national drug plan proposed by the Advisory Council has recommended a modest cost sharing 
formula for prescription drugs. The Council has recommended, “out of pocket costs for all 
products listed on the national formulary not exceed $5 per prescription, with a copayment of $2 
for essential medicines and an annual maximum of $100 per household per year.”12 In 
recommending this, the Council has taken into account, implicitly, various often conflicting 
rationales for and against cost-sharing. The difference of opinion arises from disagreement over 
the nature of pharmacare: 
(i) Financing healthcare costs resembles private insurance plans where the liability is 
shared between the insurer and the insured; 
(ii) Healthcare is a public service and should be paid entirely out of general tax revenue. 
The Advisory Council’s recommendation attempts a reconciliation between these two 
outlooks. This chapter assesses arguments for and against introducing direct patient cost sharing 
for accessing prescription drugs, and the theories on which they are founded. 
3.1  Alternative theories of patient cost sharing  
Different methods of cost-sharing (co-payments, deductibles, co-insurance and premiums) are 
intended either (a) to prevent ‘unnecessary’ (i.e. non-essential) utilization of necessary medication 
or (b) to reduce third-party payer expenditures by shifting part of the financial burden from insurers 
to patients. The inclusion of the rationale ‘unnecessary’ is based on two dimensions of information 
asymmetry: moral hazard and adverse selection. Information asymmetry arises when one party to 
 
12  Health Canada, A Prescription for Canada: Achieving Pharmacare for All. Final Report of the 
Advisory Council on the Implementation of National Pharmacare (Ottawa: Health Canada, June 




a transaction has relevant information that he or she could readily communicate to the other, but 
does not do so. 
(i) Moral Hazard:  Moral hazard in the context of pharmaceutical insurance arises from the 
absence of any fiscal incentive on physicians or patients to be prudent. If the cost of a 
prescription drug is zero, a patient may pressure a physician to prescribe a clinically 
unnecessary drug. Neither the patient, nor the physician (nor even the pharmacist, for that 
matter) has any incentive to resist prescribing, or resist dispensing an expensive brand-
name drug over its generic equivalent.  
(ii) Adverse Selection: Adverse selection in the context of pharmaceutical insurance arises 
when a physician's practice becomes dominated by patients prone to request unnecessary 
prescriptions. 
            Some policy analysts argue that patient cost-sharing reduces the risk of ‘moral hazard’ by 
introducing out-of-pocket expenditures. The Advisory Council endorsed the ‘moral hazard’ 
argument, in the belief that cost-sharing can “encourage the proper use of drugs.”13 However, the 
Council found very little evidence that ‘free’ prescription medicines lead to overuse, abuse, or 
wastage. The Council’s report cites a Scottish study, which found that, as co-payments were 
gradually reduced, use of prescription medications went up : “This increase slowed considerably 
over the course of four years, suggesting that the initial uptick in use was because some people 
had not been getting the drugs they needed, rather than a surge in wasteful consumption.”14 
Moreover, cost-sharing, however modest, adds to the cost of administration, and creates a barrier 
at the point of care.  
          Moral hazard may arise from inappropriate prescribing practices. According to much 
expert testimony, quality prescribing is difficult and complex because of proliferation of drugs 
(over 13,000 drugs on the Canadian market alone) and also because seniors with multiple chronic 
diseases may need 10 or more medications simultaneously. Dr. Anne Holbrook, an expert witness, 
told the House Standing Committee that many physicians lack necessary skills due to inadequate 
 
13    Heath Canada, ibid., p. 61. 




training. They receive altogether some 9 to 50 hours in medical school time in ‘Clinical 
Pharmacology,’ and are necessarily left vulnerable to influence of pharmaceutical companies. In 
Dr. Holbrook’s opinion, inappropriate prescribing practices result in 300,000 Canadians suffering 
serious, disabling, or fatal medication-related harm annually and 20% of Canadian medical 
malpractice cases relate to prescribing of medications.15 The House Standing Committee report on 
pharmacare records evidence tendered by many other expert witnesses to the same effect.  
        Curbing over-prescribing behaviour by physicians and other medical professionals may 
significantly reduce prescription drug spending and thus have indirect effects on cost-sharing by 
patients in at least two ways: (i) it will help reduce overall spending on drugs and save money for 
the federal government; (ii) savings from fewer prescriptions make patient cost-sharing burden 
lighter. An international meta-study from Germany, however, forcefully contradicts the logic of 
adverse selection in prescription drugs policy. It analyses the extensive theoretical and empirical 
literature on patient cost-sharing published during the last forty years, showing that persuasive 
evidence for demand-side adverse selection among patients is lacking. According to this study, the 
commonly presented empirical evidence that, in absence of co-payments, patients might overuse 
or misuse or abuse the health system is not found. The meta-study concludes that health insurance 
beneficiaries are not aiming to abuse the health system. In fact, introducing cost-sharing seems to 
endanger proper healthcare since it deters the sick from claiming the benefits.16 
 It appears that the information asymmetry problem stems more from influence on 
physicians by pharmaceutical companies than from hypochondriac patients. Extensive advertising 
by pharmaceutical firms induces physicians to prescribe their brand products. A recent study in 
the US has found 23% of out-patient prescriptions inappropriate, with an additional 35% deemed 
 
15  Dr. Anne Holbrook, in Pharmacare Now: Prescription Medicine Coverage for all Canadians: 
Report of the Standing Committee on Health, [Chair: Bill Casey] (Ottawa: House of Commons), 
April 2018, p. 57; https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/HESA/report-14 
16  Holst, J., Patient Cost Sharing-Reforms without Evidence. Theoretical Considerations and 
Empirical Findings from Industrialized Countries: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical 
Findings from Industrialized Countries (Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, 





potentially inappropriate.17 Another US study found similar evidence, estimating 40% of 
antibiotics filled by older adults potentially inappropriate.18 An Ontario study indicated that 46% 
of seniors with a non-bacterial infection were prescribed antibiotics. 19 
Responsibility for antibiotic prescribing falls mostly on physicians in community settings 
such as family clinics. While some antibiotics are prescribed in hospital settings, most are not; 
92% of prescriptions are dispensed in the community, and family physicians are responsible for 
65% of all prescriptions in Canada (PHAC, 2018). National CARSS (Canadian Antimicrobial 
Resistance Surveillance System) data indicates that overall prescription rate for antibiotics in 
Canada remained steady over the last several years, at roughly 20 defined daily doses (DDDs) 
per 1,000 inhabitant-days. This equates to roughly 2% of the Canadian population receiving an 
anti-microbial on a typical day with an estimated annual expenditure of approximately $822 
million (PHAC, 2018). If an estimated 20%-40% of antibiotics are prescribed inappropriately, 
that would equate to roughly $165-$330 million of expenditures for unnecessary anti-
microbials.20  
 
17  Chua, K., Fischer, M., & Linder, J. (2019). Appropriateness of outpatient antibiotic prescribing 
among privately insured US patients: ICD-10-CM based cross sectional study. BMJ 364: k5092. 
Doi: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.k5092    
18  Olesen, S., Barnett, M., MacFadden, D., Lipsitch, M., & Grad, Y. (2018). Trends in outpatient 
antibiotic use and prescribing practice among US older adults, 2011- 15: observational study. BMJ 
362: k3155. Doi: 10.1136/bmj.k3155  
19  Mercer, C. (2019). Education needed--for doctors and patients--to reduce inappropriate 
prescriptions. CMAJ, 191(18), E514-E515. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1503/cmaj.109-5742; 
Silverman, M., Povitz, M., Sontrop, J., Li, L., Richard, L., Cejic, S., & Shariff, S. (2017). Antibiotic 
prescribing for nonbacterial acute upper respiratory infections in elderly persons. Ann Intern Med, 
166, 765-774. DOI:10.7326/M16-1131  
20  Bowbrick, C. War on Drug Resistance: Policy Interventions to Tackle Antibiotic Misuse in Canada, 





As the data show, over-prescribing or inappropriate prescribing is significant. Many 
Canadians who can well afford their prescription drugs are being over-medicated, whereas millions 
of Canadians cannot access the medication they need. Drug companies lobby both prescribers and 
patients. However, prescribers are professionals with primary responsibility for prescribing. Since 
prescriptions are created by doctors, it is the doctors who should be addressed first to reduce 
inappropriate prescribing practices. Other steps against inappropriate lobbying of pharmaceutical 
companies should also be taken in order to break this vicious cycle. 
Imposing a limited cost-sharing by patients might have a small role in curbing over-
prescribing practices but it will not likely affect higher income groups in society who are the most 
over-medicated. It is more likely to affect lower-income groups who are under-medicated under 
the present system. In order to address the problem of over-prescribing in its entirety a sound 
strategy of public policy is required. This will require education campaigns targeting professional 
care providers and the general public and limits on the ability of pharmaceutical companies to 
lobby.  
3.2 Effects of patient co-payments 
The objective of this research project being an assessment as to whether a cost-sharing 
element should be incorporated in a national pharmaceutical insurance plan, I reviewed the 
relevant literature on the topic. 
There is concern in this literature that any kind of cost-sharing carries the risk of reducing 
the probability of patients completely following a pharmaceutical-based plan of treatment.21 
Furthermore, failure to regularly follow a plan of treatment may shift the cost-burden to other more 
expensive healthcare services down the line. There is legitimate concern about over-prescribing, 
which may be exacerbated with a national insurance program without cost-sharing. A peer-
reviewed survey of recent research on various cost-sharing schemes (including caps and co-
payments) finds that increasing what people pay for medicines has a two-fold impact: first, a 
reduction in the insurers’ expenditures on drugs and, secondly, a reduction in the patients’ drug 
 
21  Luiza, V.L. et al., ‘Pharmaceutical policies: effects of cap and co-payment on rational use of 
medicines (Review),’ Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews 2015, 5: CD007017. DOI: 




utilization. Such reductions may not be limited to ‘unnecessary’ or marginal medications alone. 
Cost-sharing may include “reductions in the use of life-sustaining medicines as well as medicines 
that are important in treating chronic conditions and medicines for asymptomatic conditions.” 22 
The impact of cost-sharing on utilization of healthcare services is, however, quite 
ambivalent. According to the meta-survey cited above, cost-sharing leads either to small or no 
decreases in utilization of healthcare services; the effects remain uncertain. Modest cost sharing is 
less likely to reduce the use of essential medicines or to increase the use of other healthcare 
services.23 As the Advisory Council noted: 
Cost-sharing, while common, is criticized by health policy experts because it can prevent 
people from taking the medicines they need to stay healthy. Research shows even small 
charges to patients when they pick up prescriptions can be a barrier to getting needed 
medication, which can hurt their health and often cost the health system more down the 
road. User-fees are typically regressive, which means they impose a greater financial 
burden on low- than high- income households. User-fees can be particularly hard on 
patients (i.e., counter-productive) with chronic conditions, because they have to use 
prescribed pharmaceuticals year after year.24  
All user-fees have negative equity implications. “Even modest user-fees, while not a 
serious deterrent for middle-income and high-income earners,” G.P. Marchildon pointed out, “can 
prevent low-income individuals from seeking needed care.”25 Shifting costs from the insurer to the 
consumer in low-income (and vulnerable) populations may lead to discontinuation of necessary 
 
22  Luiza, V.L. et al., p. 4. 
23  Luiza, V. L., et al., ibid. 
24   Health Canada, ibid., pp. 60-61. 
25  Marchildon, G.P., ‘Private Finance and Canadian Medicare: Learning from History,’ in Flood, 
C.M. and Thomas, B., eds., Is Two-Tier Health Care the Future? (Ottawa: University of Ottawa 




medicines, which may cause deterioration of health and increased healthcare utilization and 
expenditures for patients and for insurers.26 
Out-of-pocket charges for drugs are associated with forgoing prescription drugs and other 
necessities and substituting additional healthcare services. A cross-sectional study in 2016 
surveyed 28,091 Canadians regarding prescription drug affordability, consequent use of health 
care services and trade-offs with other expenditures.  It found that 5.5% reported being unable to 
afford one or more drugs in the prior year, representing 8.2% of those with at least one prescription. 
Drugs for mental health conditions were most commonly reported for cost-related non-adherence. 
About 303,000 had additional doctor visits, about 93,000 sought care in an emergency department, 
and about 26,000 were admitted to hospitals. Many forwent basic needs like foodstuff (about 
730,000), heat (about 238,000) and other health care expenses (about 239,000) because of drug 
costs. These outcomes were more common among females, younger adults, Aboriginal peoples, 
those with poorer health status, those lacking drug insurance and those with lower income.27 
Many participants in a 2016 Community Health Survey said they could not afford one or 
more prescriptions, although about 38% had private insurance and 21% had public coverage. 
Despite having insurance, they could not pay because most drug plans require members to pay co-
payment or coinsurance.28 Several studies of the impact of out-of-pocket charges on seniors and 
people dependent on social assistance found that more were admitted to hospitals and nursing 
homes after co-payments were introduced; death rates among them also increased. According to 
another Community Health Survey, also in 2016, 43% who skipped prescriptions (because they 
couldn’t afford them) said their health worsened.29  
 
26   Luiza, V.L. et al., ibid., p.17. 
27   Law, M.R. et al., ‘The Consequences of patient charges for prescription drugs in Canada: a cross-
sectional survey,’ CMAJ OPEN, (2018), 6(1): E63-E70; cited, Health Canada, ibid., p.47.  
28   Macdonald, D. and Sanger, T., ‘A Prescription for Savings: Federal Revenue Options for 
Pharmacare and their Distributional Impacts on Houses, Businesses and Governments,’ Canadian 
Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2018; cited, Health Canada, ibid., p.45. 
29   Statistics Canada, Canadian Community Health Survey (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2016); cited, 




Other empirical studies are not as clear cut as the above study. A US study, published in 
2008, found that, after co-payment implementation, utilization of prescription drugs declined 
significantly by 17.2% (P<0.0001). This pattern was observed at varying degrees for all drug 
classes investigated. Patients with diabetes, respiratory disease, and schizophrenia immediately 
reduced their use of non-indicated drugs significantly more than drugs indicated for their 
condition. Among Medicaid recipients, nominal co-payments are associated with significant 
reductions in use of clinically important drug classes. However, patients with other chronic disease 
exhibited a differential response depending on the disease indication of the drug class.30 A recent 
European review of various empirical studies (from 1990 to 2011) across a wide range of countries 
assessed the distributional consequences of co-payments. The study indicates that co-payments 
encouraged those with low income and, in particular, those in need of care to reduce their use more 
than the remaining population. It is clear that cost sharing involves some important economic and 
political trade-offs. 31  
Introduction of direct patient charges in Quebec which shifted drug benefits from $0 or $2 
per prescription to a 25 percent coinsurance charge (setting annual caps, depending on income, at 
$200, $500 or $750), decreased drug use by 9% per day in the elderly and 14% among people on 
social assistance.32 Another analogous policy change in Nova Scotia, which modified seniors’ 
coverage from no copayment to $3 per prescription (up to an annual maximum of $150), resulted 
in reduction of drug use in the concerned patient group significantly. It was found that among those 
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who were even unlikely to reach their annual maximum, the use of drugs for peptic ulcers and 
reflux disease dropped by 5% and the number of users of one type of diabetes drug also decreased 
by 5%.33  
Defenders of the status quo, nevertheless, continue to argue that the existing provincial 
drug plans (which entail substantial cost-sharing by patients) are workable and fair because they 
entail only limited cost-sharing for lower-income Canadians.34 For these defenders, prescription 
medicines with co-payments and other forms of cost sharing are affordable for all Canadians, 
except for a small segment of the population best taken care of by existing provincial plans.35 
However, the most compelling evidence of harms caused by the current system came from 
front-line healthcare workers who witness them daily. For instance, as Dr. Danyal Raza testifies 
before the House Standing Committee on Health, “People certainly die from complication of their 
medical conditions that often are untreated because they don’t have access to pharmaceuticals.” 
Dr. Raza estimated that between 5.4 percent and 6.5 percent of hospital admissions are the result 
of non-adherence to recommended drug treatments, resulting in annual costs to the tune of $1.6 
billion.36 
It is evident that there are positive and negative consequences from implementation of cost 
sharing as a source of the healthcare financing. On one hand, the burden of cost sharing increases 
awareness of costs for treatment and may limit unnecessary use of healthcare services. On the 
other hand, it prevents some patients from accessing needed care. Some recent studies reviewed 
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by Kolasa and Kowalczyk find that, in the majority of cases, the health policy impact of out-of-
pocket payments on heath outcome is insignificant. Reduction of the out-of-pocket burden, these 
authors conclude, cannot be achieved successfully without adequate extension of healthcare 
coverage or engagement of other sources of healthcare financing. When formal fees are being 
introduced, protection against catastrophic healthcare payments is needed for the most vulnerable 
groups. 37 
One meta-analysis shows an 11% increase in odds of non-adherence to medicines in 
publicly insured populations where copayments for medicines are necessary.38 This meta-analysis 
included 199,996 people overall, 74,236 people in the copayment group and 125,760 people in the 
non-copayment group. Average age was 71.75 years. In the copayment group versus the non-
copayment group, the odds ratio for non-adherence was 1.11 (95% CI 1.09–1.14; P = <0.00001). 
Another meta-study concluded that imposing patient charges is relatively less effective in reducing 
prescribing than influencing prescribing doctors and regulating the pharmaceutical industry itself: 
“It may be that the undesirable consequences of policies influencing patients, particularly user 
charges, outweigh the benefits,” and that, “it is more appropriate to influence prescribing and 
although interventions to improve prescribing practice have been developed, they often achieve 
relatively modest benefits and sometimes at high cost”.39  
This leads us to agree with Sinnott et al. that policy makers should be wary of “potential 
negative clinical outcomes resulting from non-adherence, and also possible knock-on economic 
repercussions.”40 
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Expert Testimonies on Effects of Copayment given to the House Standing 
Committee on a National Pharmaceutical Policy  
 
In this chapter I attempt to compile some key evidence offered by expert witnesses appearing 
before the House Standing Committee on Health touching on the effect of copayments and on 
various measures suggested to finance the cost of a universal national pharmacare program for 
Canada. The balance of opinion favours imposing no or very low-cost sharing. 
Dr. Steven Morgan, Dr. Danielle Martin and Dr. Marc-André Gagnon, in their witness 
testimony before the House Committee, severally suggested that a universal prescription drug 
coverage program is the best way to ensure equal access to prescription drugs for all Canadians 
and to ensure that the drugs covered by such a program are worth the money they would cost. They 
recommended that the federal government, subject to the agreement of provinces and territories, 
implement a public drug plan that provides universal coverage to all Canadians with little or no 
direct cost to patients. Dr. Danielle Martin explained that extremely low or zero cost sharing is 
necessary because of the strong evidence that even very small payments can prevent individuals 
with relatively low incomes from filling their prescriptions.41  
These experts are of the opinion that to make the pharmacare program sustainable and 
effective, it should provide coverage only for drugs listed on a single Canadian formulary, to be 
developed on the basis of best evidence on the risks and benefits of each drug. In their view the 
program should be managed by a publicly accountable management agency, which would establish 
the formulary and conduct price negotiations.42 
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Dr. Marc-André Gagnon explained to the Committee that the management agency could be 
modelled on the Canadian Blood Services (CBS), an independent agency funded and governed by 
provincial and territorial governments, responsible for bulk purchasing and managing a national 
formulary of plasma protein products developed in collaboration with the Canadian Agency for 
Drugs and Technologies in Health (CADTH). He recommended that a similar independent agency 
could manage the pharmacare program by merging the CADTH and the Pan-Canadian 
Pharmaceutical Alliance (pCPA).43 
Steve Morgan estimated savings of approximately $7 billion a year through reduced 
administrative costs, savings from joint price negotiations and drug purchasing, and reduced 
spending on drugs offering limited therapeutic benefit. A universal public drug coverage program 
would shift approximately $10 billion in costs from the private sector to the public sector.  The 
federal government could raise funds for its portion of the agency’s budget using a variety of 
mechanisms, such as corporate taxes, income taxes, GST and/or premiums. The new program 
would replace existing private drug coverage plans but private insurance companies could continue 
to play a role in administering claims for the program and/or providing additional coverage for 
drugs not listed on the formulary. 
Greg Marchildon outlined two possible approaches regarding how a national universal 
public pharmacare program could be implemented in Canada. First, the national pharmacare 
program could be modelled on Medicare in Canada, which would involve expanding the Canada 
Health Act to include medically necessary prescription drugs dispensed outside of a hospital setting 
with federal financing provided through the Canada Health Transfer. Provinces and territories 
would run their own single-payer pharmacare plans and would remain legally responsible for their 
respective formularies. However, it would be possible for the federal, provincial and territorial 
governments to undertake negotiations to establish a single national drug formulary.  
He outlined another option in which the federal government would be entirely responsible 
for both managing and financing the national universal program, under which prescription drug 
coverage would be provided to all Canadians by the federal government, replacing private and 
 




public coverage plans currently in place, with a single universal plan.44 Under this option there 
would be a federal formulary solely legislated and regulated by the federal government. A federal 
agency would be responsible for determining the national formulary and undertake price 
negotiations with drug manufacturers. According to Marchildon, this approach would offer the 
greatest potential to keep costs down, maintain clear lines of accountability, and eliminate 
individual and regional differences in coverage and access to prescription drugs.  
Ake Blomqvist held that the federal government should focus on developing a strategy 
within its present jurisdiction and support reforms already underway at the provincial level. He 
suggests addressing gaps in prescription drug coverage to ensure that every citizen has access to a 
default plan with an upper limit on the percentage of income that a family spends on drugs. Ottawa 
should offer partial financial support to provinces to meet that standard. The federal government 
could take the lead role in the pCPA and make arrangements to support the inclusion of private 
insurers in the pCPA. Patented drug prices, he thought, could also be reduced substantially through 
regulatory changes to the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board (PMPRB). 45  
The Canadian Medical Association favors the federal government providing additional 
funding to the provinces and territories to allow them to expand the coverage offered through their 
existing programs. The federal government could provide funding to the provinces and territories 
to enable them to establish an annual upper limit for out-of-pocket drug costs of $1,500 or 3% of 
income. The Association estimated that the cost to the federal government of covering the entire 
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Evidence from Select Comparator Countries  
 
Many high-income countries have incorporated cost-sharing provisions into their universal 
prescription drug programs. For instance, in the OECD (Organization of Economic Co-operation 
and Development) Australia, New Zealand and the UK are significant comparator countries for 
Canada.  
Australia instituted the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS), a national universal 
program, to subsidize medications for all Australians and the government negotiates the price of 
medicines with manufacturers, to keep prices low for consumers.47 From January 1, 2020 
individuals with concession cards pay AUS $6.60 for most PBS medicines. However, for 
individuals without a concession card the maximum co-payment for the highest cost medicines 
may go up to AUS $41.30. The government pays the cost above the cap. Another provision of 
cost-sharing under PBS is that since January 1, 2016, pharmacists may choose to discount the 
patient co-payment up to AUS $1.00. The overall amount of co-payment is adjusted every year in 
line with the Consumer Price Index (CPI).48 The formulary has no budgetary cap, meaning that as 
demand and medication availability grows, so do allocated funds. The bottom line being that no 
class of medication for a patient in effect remains unsubsidized.49  
New Zealand provides universal prescription drugs coverage for everyone living in the 
country with subsidized drugs through the Pharmaceutical Management Agency (PHARMAC), a 
Crown entity) that decides which drugs should be subsidized and by how much. Doctors generally 
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prescribe the medicine which is subsidized.50 The amount of copayment for people with a High 
Use Health Card is NZ $3.00. However, for people without the Card it is NZ $5.51 But it so happens 
that most of the prescription drug users pay NZ$3 (£1.40; €1.70; US$2.20).52 There are no 
copayments for children aged 13 and under. Another important provision of patient cost-sharing 
is that once patients and their families have collected 20 new prescription items in a year they 
won’t have to pay any more prescription charges until 1 February the following year.53 The 
successful operation of PHARMAC is considered to be the key reason for New Zealand’s low co-
payments and pharmaceutical prices.  
In the United Kingdom, the National Health Service (NHS) provides a true 
comprehensive coverage for all prescription drugs outside hospitals and other medically necessary 
products which require no co-payments by a great majority of the population.54 The population 
categories enjoying free prescription drugs, regardless of income, include people (i) aged 60 or 
over, (ii) under 16, (iii) between 16-18 and are engaged in full-time education, (iv) are pregnant or 
have had a baby in the previous 12 months, (v) have a specified medical condition, (vi) have a 
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continuing physical disability, or (vii) hold a pension exemption. It also includes people under 20 
and a dependent of someone, people who are, or their partners are receiving: (i) income support, 
(ii) jobseeker allowance, (iii) employment and support allowance, (iv) pension credit guarantee 
credit, (v) universal credit, (vi) NHS tax credit exemption, (vii) have income for tax credit purposes 
of £15, 276 or less, and (viii) NHS certificate for full help.55 For people who do not fall into the 
above categories the current prescription charge is £ 9.35 ($16 CAD).56  
In sum, Australia, New Zealand and the UK all fund universal public insurance to cover 
the cost of prescription drugs for their citizens, without deductibles and with limited or no 
copayments for eligible prescription drugs. These systems are financed through general tax 
revenues. Through their progressive taxation systems, the cost of care is shared among all members 
of society according to their means. This model was recommended for Canada in the past by the 
Hall Commission (1964), the National Forum on Health (1997) and the House of Commons 
Standing Committee on Health (2018).57 
 In contrast, however, in France, Germany and the Netherlands, residents buy health 
insurance, including drug coverage, from insurers that are primarily not-for-profit; it must meet 
standards set by the government. Though the funding method is different, the experience for 
patients is similar to single-payer systems with a single formulary, uniform drug coverage and 
similar out-of-pocket costs. In France and Germany, individuals are required to make modest 
copayments for their prescriptions. In the Netherlands, individuals must pay an annual 
deductible of approximately $600 CAD for all their healthcare costs (including prescription drug 
costs), but do not pay any copayments for prescriptions at the pharmacy. Residents of these 
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countries can also purchase complementary private insurance for things not covered by their 
statutory health insurance.58 
How are other high-income countries attempting to limit over-prescribing? 
One of the most remarkable (and successful) approaches to curbing over-prescribing 
behavior is apparent in the United Kingdom where a system for rewarding physicians for efficient 
prescribing is in place.59 This strategy of financial incentives for efficient prescribing appears to 
meet with success compared to comparator countries, say the United States. In the US, where the 
strategy was followed to some extent, it has met with only limited success, in part because the 
payments offered were modest relative to a doctor’s normal salary.60 In contrast, GPs in the UK 
generally take a stronger stand in dissuading patients from abusing their NHS facilities and firmly 
believe that ‘costs to the system are as important as costs to the individual patient.’61 
In Canada too, educating doctors about the adverse effects of over-prescribing is only likely 
to impact modestly as most over-prescribing practices occur due to the inappropriate influence of 
the pharmaceutical representatives. The individual physician’s integrity to resist temptations to 
succumb to lucrative offers by pharmaceutical companies is of crucial importance here. It thus 
appears that strategies on re-education should reiterate, as in the case of UK, certain  core values 
like general welfare and ethical considerations to restrain them from over-prescribing. In addition, 
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putting a comprehensive oversight mechanism in place to monitor suspect prescribing practices is 
likely to be effective in curbing inappropriate prescribing.  
Lessons from contemporary experience in reducing over-prescribing in comparator 
countries are at best ambivalent. Several attempts have been made in the US in recent years. The 
Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs), using state-run electronic databases to track the 
prescribing and dispensing of controlled prescription drugs to patients, have proved better than 
other campaigns as tools for preventing and identifying prescription drug misuse. PDMPs in some 
states have been found to be associated with lower rates of opioid prescribing and overdose.62 In 
another approach some pharmacies developed hotlines to alert other pharmacies in the region as 
and when they detected a suspected or fraudulent prescription. The implications of these 
experiments are clear. Pharmacists can play a significant role in preventing rampant over-
prescribing practices.  Being on guard for prescription falsifications or alterations, pharmacists 
may prove useful as the first line of defense in identifying problematic patterns in prescription 
drug use.63  
Other experiments, based on peer intervention method were conducted on small scales, 
have also proven successful. In one experiment, prescribers were sent monthly emails with 
information on their prescribing performance relative to their peers. Those with the lowest record 
of inappropriate antibiotic prescribing rates were congratulated as ‘top performer,’ and those not 
meeting this standard were simply told ‘You are not a top performer.’ The information thus passed 
on also included a personalized count of unnecessary antibiotic prescriptions by the individual 
prescriber beside the count for a typical top performer. This tactic of ‘peer comparison approach’ 
helped reduce inappropriate prescribing significantly, from 19.9%t in the pre-intervention period 
to 3.7% during the post-intervention period — overall an 81% reduction.64 
In another experiment, whenever a doctor prescribed an antibiotic not clearly called for by 
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‘antibiotic justification note.’ The experiment also provided for entering the note into the patient’s 
medical record and making it visible to others. Introducing this ‘speed bump’ into the work flow, 
along with the barrier of social accountability, reduced inappropriate prescriptions from 23.2% to 
5.2%. The controlling practices in this experiment also experienced reductions, possibly because 
doctors knew they were being monitored, but both the approaches were effective.65 
  
 







A total of ten semi-structured qualitative interviews with select stakeholders and subject-matter 
experts were conducted between July 2020 and November 2020. Respondents included public 
policy analysts and healthcare professionals. Many important themes emerged from the interviews. 
Some key themes are discussed below.  
6.1  Importance of a universal single-payer public system of prescription drug coverage  
Respondents attributed varying degrees of importance to the implementation of a universal single-
payer public system of prescription drug coverage in Canada. A common theme is that, on the one 
hand, the precariousness in drug affordability and health outcomes and, on the other, uncertain 
employment may soon be pushing Canada’s lack of a comprehensive national pharmacare strategy 
into an acute crisis.  
They also emphasised that many of the current health issues, such as mental health, would 
be significantly impacted by the implementation of a single-payer system. Here is an excerpt 
recognizing the critical importance of this issue to Canadians: “I am strongly in favor of a single-
payer insurance system. In my opinion, it is clear that the health system in Canada is due for a 
major rework, no matter how complicated or difficult it will be.” --(R003) 
One respondent, however, expressed concern that such a program would ‘stifle 
innovation’. 
6.2  The question of ‘moral hazard’ and mandatory co-payments  
A majority of respondents (seven out of ten) attributed low importance to the phenomenon of 
moral hazard; three out of ten, nevertheless, thought that the problem of overuse or misuse of drugs 
has a high importance.  
Respondents distinguished between two categories of prescription drugs, essential and 




respondents favoured no copayments for essential prescription drugs, drawing an analogy with the 
existing situation of no cost sharing for physician and hospital care.  
Moral hazard is of minor importance. Cost sharing make sense if the government is looking 
to spend less on pharmacare, but to say that cost sharing would also encourage the 
appropriate use of drugs/improve efficiency seems like a stretch. People already usually 
receive full primary health coverage when they visit their doctor’s office, get an operation, 
etc., and to my knowledge there aren’t many people who are abusing that system just 
because they don’t have to cost share for it. If moral hazard is a concern, then that should 
be addressed when selecting which drugs would be covered under a national pharmacare 
plan. Prescriptions that are primarily used for non-essential purposes could require cost 
sharing while prescriptions that are deemed essential would not.” –(R004) 
On the other hand, the argument in favour of co-payment in regulating patient behaviour 
in a ‘responsible’ way is articulated in the following quotation: “Cost sharing is good, as it puts 
“skin in the game,” which encourages responsible behaviour.” —(R002) 
6.3 On abiding by the Canada Health Act, 1984 
The Advisory Council proposes, with good intentions, that a Canadian universal pharmaceutical 
program respect the five principles of the Canada Health Act, 1984 which of course include the 
principle that prescription drugs should be accessible to all Canadians without any cost barriers, 
i.e., without infringing ‘the accessibility clause’. However, at the same time it has recommended 
modest cost sharing under a universal plan (i.e., $2 and $5 per prescription for essential and other 
drugs, respectively, with a maximum limit of $100 per year per household).  
Responses from our participants on this rather involved question are mixed. The question, 
involves two decision points. Does the Advisory Council’s recommendation of introducing small 
copayments constitute a violation of the fundamental principle of universal access enshrined in the 
Canada Health Act, 1984. The second asks if copayments would require a legislative exemption 
from the “accessibility” clause to reconcile them with the letter of the Canada Health Act, 1984.  
A corollary to these questions implies another: would it subsequently cause damage by 




I’m not convinced that an exemption would be required with the co-pay levels set very low, 
annual limits of $100 per household and co-pays waived for low-income situations. It could 
be argued that accessibility issues are mitigated with these proposed strategies in place. -
- (R001) 
This respondent elaborated the point further:  
If an actual exemption were required it would not be a good thing, nonetheless we have 
experienced other potentially destabilizing precedents without much impact. For example, 
the Chaoulli v Quebec decision in 2005 makes it possible to receive private hip or knee 
replacements in the province if a public waiting time is too long. Despite Chaoulli, the 
Canada Health Act is still considered legitimate across the country (despite the great 
omission of pharmacare). --(R001) 
At the other end of the spectrum the alternative view is that cost sharing, however 
insignificant, constitutes a violation of the spirit of the Canada Health act, 1984 as well as the goal 
of ‘universal’ healthcare: I believe copayments violate the intention of the [Canada] Health Act, 
[1984] and the intention of universal healthcare. --(R003) A third respondent proposes a golden 
mean of keeping copayments apart from the spirit of the Canada Health Act and put it a safe 
distance away from its effects by some kind of enabling legislation: 
Amending the Canada Health Act [1984]’s principle on accessibility could be a problem, 
but I’m not a legal expert so I can’t really comment on the precedent it would set. Another 
option could be to develop a separate piece of stand-alone legislation tailored for a 
national pharmacare plan. This could avoid the problems associated with opening up the 
Canada Health Act, [1984]. --(R004) 
6.4  On the assumed modes of cost sharing 
On the assumption that cost sharing is to be introduced, each participant was asked to choose one 
or a combination (the Advisory Council recommended a fixed co-payment and ceiling) from the 
following options:  
A. With a cap policy, patients are reimbursed for their prescription medicines up 




B. With a fixed co-payment policy, patients pay a fixed amount per medicine or 
prescription.  
C. With a co-insurance policy, patients pay a set percentage of the price of the 
prescription or medicine, rather than a fixed fee.  
D. With a ceiling policy, patients pay full cost or part of the cost up to a certain 
amount, then are given medicines for free or at reduced cost.66 
The participants made a wide range of choices. No majority consensus emerged on any 
particular option offered above:  
I think this combination is largely pointless. If copay must be instated, I would prefer either 
the ceiling or fixed cost options, as the combination does not really offer a significant 
change over free, universal access. – (R003) 
However, this respondent preferred either option D or option B over the other two options. 
 Another respondent (R002), opined that option C is the best option, for it guards against 
any perceived moral hazard and at the same time will guarantee full public payment of medicines 
in case of rare diseases, which are truly unaffordable to the average patient. Here is the statement 
of this respondent: 
I think C is critical to ensuring the system is not abused and is used responsibly (unlike 
Europe), but if someone has a rare disease – where drugs in the “free market” would cost 
thousands of dollars – it would be in the spirit of the Canada Health Act to publicly pay 
in-full any price beyond a certain threshold, so that payment is truly affordable – 
accessible, universal, comprehensive, etc. for all. -- (R002) 
6.5  Substitution of generic bio-similar drugs and reduction of drug spending  
Extensive substitution of generics in place of brand name drugs is an effective way to reduce the 
current high drug cost and a single-payer insurance program stands in a position to lower rapidly 
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rising drug prices by bulk purchasing. The argument against generic substitution is loss of 
pharmaceutical research in Canada. Accordingly, participants were asked what importance they 
attached to reduction in drug prices relative to the maintenance of research efforts by brand 
companies in Canada. 
The responses generated several themes. All (ten out of ten) participants agreed 
unanimously that price reduction should be the first priority. Most (nine out of ten) equally 
emphasised the substitution of generics over brand name drugs as a way to price reduction. Sharing 
similar views on generic substitution, they also offered various insights on the impact of such a 
policy on the pharmaceutical companies in Canada. The outstanding theme that emerged 
concluded there would not be a substantial damaging impact of generic substitution for brand name 
drugs on the healthcare sector and pharmaceutical R&D.  
What follows are similar statements made by the respondents:  
I believe that the contributions of pharmaceutical companies are overstated and the 
contributions currently made by them can easily be replicated in other areas/institutions. -
- (R003). 
Another statement closely echoes this view:  
I think keeping drug prices down is more important than ensuring the profits of the 
Canadian pharmaceutical industry, but the latter is still important. – (R005). 
Two more statements are worth quoting at length for the force of their argument: 
The concern about pharmaceutical research being hindered is not borne out by data as far 
as I understand. For example, the United Kingdom’s ‘Generics share of the 
pharmaceutical market’ was second in 2013; and their ‘business expenditure on R& D in 
the pharmaceutical industry’ was the 5thamong OECD countries; the rankings are similar 




, respectively). [From ‘Health at a Glance 2015, OECD Indicators’]. 
-- (R001) 
It’s likely true that pharmacare would de-incentivize pharmaceutical development in 
Canada to some degree, although I’m not sure by how much. However, other countries 




it’s not clear to me how much a pharmacare system would tangibly change home-grown 
pharmaceuticals in Canada. – (R004) 
Having agreed on the necessity of price reduction, one participant begged to differ on the 
ways and means of such reduction, emphasizing strongly the need to allow free competition (i.e., 
among the companies), not government intervention, to effect long term drug price reduction. It’s 
worth quoting: 
It is a myth that monopolies reduce prices. They don’t. Competition reduces prices. 
Moreover, producers will not invest in improving productivity – which dramatically cuts 
costs – if they do not anticipate being rewarded for doing so. Anyone today, even the 
poorest Canadian, can afford a cheap drug like aspirin, which only the rich could afford 
when first produced. Government policies did not reduce the price of aspirin. Although 
some exceptions exist, this general principle holds true for the bulk of the pharma industry. 
-- (R002) 
Most respondents wanted that the pharmacare program reimburse patients at the cost of the 
lowest-price generic available; if the patient wished a more expensive brand equivalent, then the 
concerned patient must shoulder the difference.  
However, one respondent preferred that the physician be allowed to decide his or her 
preferred brand; the pharmacist must dispense the specified brand and reimburse the patient at the 
relevant brand cost (subject to a copayment if imposed). This respondent also emphasized that the 
pharmacists’ role should be expanded in deciding the appropriate drug: 
I think pharmacists should be given more authority than doctors. They know more about 
drugs/costs than any other party, and doctors frequently rely on the information provided 
to them by pharmaceutical [industry] lobbyists/ salespeople. –(R005) 
The conclusive point among most respondents was that, whether doctors or pharmacists 
decide, choosing the cheaper generic drug remains the rational option:  
If there are bio-similar generics available for a given pharmaceutical, then it wouldn’t 
make much sense clinically to have the physician decide his/her preferred brand; they 
should all have virtually the same clinical effect, so it would almost always make more 




6.6  On the drugs to be covered in the universal insurance plan 
Developing and administering the national formulary is a key responsibility of a national 
pharmacare program.67 Respondents raised three important themes:  
• establish an independent national agency that relies on ‘evidence-based’ research; 
• determine whether the provinces could add to or subtract from the national formulary;  
• determine policy on specialized drugs whose cost exceeds some specified ceiling.  
Most of the respondents (eight out of ten) preferred a mandatory formulary relying on 
‘evidence-based’ research. While agreeing on the basic point of instituting a national formulary, 
respondents drew attention to different challenges and offered insights into how the agency should 
do its job to gain credibility. One of the emergent themes stressed the limits of an ‘evidence based’ 
approach and suggested a broader approach to ensure wider drug inclusion. On this question, one 
respondent has underscored:  
Yes, obviously, but sometimes ‘evidence-based’ definitions hinge on ideas which may 
preclude other ways of ‘seeing’. For instance, if indigenous ways of medicine were to be 
included, then the definition of ‘evidence-based’ might need to allow for other than the 
double-blind-control-trial gold-standard in terms of ‘evidence’. – (R001) 
There was also a suggestion for the national drug formulary to include “off-label” [using a 
drug for an illness or disease other than the authorized reason for use, sometimes called ‘expanded 
use’] drugs:  
The formularies often exclude ‘off-label’ uses. This is a major limitation, in my view, 
saddling patients with the cost of these drugs or preventing physicians from using them. – 
(R003) 
 This position leads to the conclusion that the formulary should be open, and physicians 
should be free to prescribe whatever drug they see fit without having to consult a formulary.  
 




Another significant theme concerned the independence, integrity, and sustainability of the 
drug agency. Several respondents raised concerns about measures the government ought to take to 
ensure the integrity of the independent agency:  
I also question the independence of the national agency, knowing that patient groups have 
often been courted by pharmaceutical companies even through direct funding. How can 
the government ensure that this agency is not captured? – (R001) 
Another respondent strongly disagreed with the idea of a formulary as such because it 
would be under the nominally independent agency, which itself would be susceptible to 
bureaucratic inefficiency: “Such an agency would be prone to economic failure far worse than any 
‘market failure’, not to mention the risks of corruption.” – (R002) 
It was largely agreed by most that, in the interest of maintaining a universal formulary, the 
provinces (and territories) should fully adhere to the national formulary, which would guarantee 
portability of the pharmacare program across the provinces (and territories). However, if certain 
specific population groups needed additional drugs, provinces (and territories) should be allowed 
to add to, but not to subtract from, the list of drugs in the universal formulary. One respondent 
argued that literal adherence to flexibility may be counter-productive: “Flexibility is important, 
but not if it comes at the cost of uneven services which vary from province-to-province. That would 
defeat the purpose of universal pharmacare. –(R005) 
A recurrent theme from each recipient was the need to make sure that drugs for rare 
diseases are not excluded from the national formulary. 
To exclude certain drugs based on their cost would be exclusionary to those who need these 
drugs to survive. With a well-managed system that incorporates review of costs, we can 






Survey Analysis  
 
This chapter summarizes findings from a short survey conducted between October and December, 
2020, using SurveyMonkey and analysed with Excel. The number of participants responding to 
the survey totalled 53. Participants reflect a broad spectrum, including healthcare professionals, 
policy analysts and members of the general public working in various sectors related to public 
health, health research, and academic experts. Since the sample size is small, the results are not 
representative of national opinion. However, they give an insight into opinions on cost sharing 
among a knowledgeable sample of the population familiar with the issue.   
7.1  Description of respondents distributed as occupational groups  
Respondents participating in this study belong to diverse categories, professionally. As presented 




























7.2  How important is a national pharmacare program? 
The question asked was as follows:  
Relative to other health policy issues in Canada – such as improving health standards in 
long-term seniors’ accommodation, addressing mental health and opioid crisis – how 
important do you think is implementation of a “universal, single-payer public system of 
prescription drug coverage”?  ̶   Choose a number, on a scale of 1-5, in "descending" order 
of preference, e.g., please tick 1 if you think "a universal single-payer public system of 
prescription drug coverage or 'pharmacare' " is the "most important concern" of all 
mentioned above and tick 5 if you consider it is only a minor concern; or tick any other 
number in between according to the importance it deserves. 
The balance of opinion is overwhelmingly in favor of adopting a national Pharmacare 
program, with little or no strings attached. Over a third (36%) consider pharmacare to be the most 
important health policy concern. Only a fifth (21%) give a low ranking (4th or 5th) to a national 
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7.3  Opinion on the importance of the ‘Moral Hazard’ argument   
One question was related to the problem of moral hazard. It asked if (and to what extent) 
introducing uniform cost sharing for prescription medicines encourages the proper use of drugs or, 
in other words, discourages improper use (i.e., moral hazard). A large majority thinks introducing 
cost sharing does not have much relevance to the moral hazard argument. The question asked was 
as follows: 
The Advisory Council has recommended a small copayment ($5 or less) for each 
prescription with an annual maximum of $100. It concluded: "Sharing cost would help to 
finance pharmacare and drug plan officials told the Council they believe it does encourage 
the proper use of drugs." With no direct payment, patients may request unjustifiable 
prescriptions, and physicians may accommodate. In your opinion, how important is this 
argument? Choose a number, on a scale of 1-5, in “descending” order of preference, e.g. 
please tick 1 if you think "patient requests for unjustifiable prescription" is the "most 
important concern" of all and tick 5 if you consider it is only a minor concern, or tick any 
other number in between according to the degree of importance it deserves. 
 
The results of the responses received (see Figure 7.3) show that only a small share (9%) of 
respondents think that moral hazard is the “most important” concern; only a third (34% = 9% + 
24%) think it is a major (most or second-most important) concern. A larger share (40% = 19% + 
21%) think that it is a minor concern (4th or 5th rank). More than a quarter (26%), the modal 














7.4  Opinion on the importance of ‘health hazard’ as a probable consequence of 
introducing any copayment 
A third question relates to the problem of non-adherence to filling prescriptions. The well-attested 
risk of "health hazard" is the converse of the problem of moral hazard. The actual question asked 
is as follows: 
Some analysts conclude that any [cost sharing] will result in an unacceptable increase in 
low-income patients not following their physicians’ recommended drug treatment. In your 
opinion, how important is this argument? Choose a number, on a scale of 1-5, in 
"descending" order of preference, e.g. please tick 1 if you think "failure to fill 
prescriptions" is the "most important concern" of all and tick 5 if you consider it is only a 
minor concern, or tick any other number in between according to the importance it 
deserves. 
The near-majority (49% = 23% + 26%) of respondents ranked "health hazard" to be first 
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7.5  On an annual ceiling of co-payment to accompany universal Pharmacare 
The next question asked the annual maximum amount to be considered in striking a balance 
between the perceived presence of ‘moral hazard’ when no copayment is made and apprehended 
risk of ‘health hazard’ when a co-payment exists. Respondents were limited to four categories 
from the lowest ($25) to the highest ($200). The actual question asked is as follows: 
If the insurance plan has a copayment, what annual maximum do you think reasonable? 
Tick one response. 
Opinion tilted towards a low maximum, if any, in fixing the annual maximum copayment 
to be required: 13% want it to be only $25; 30% want no more than $50. These two groups, 
preferring an annual maximum amount of $50 or less, comprise 43% of the sample. If we add the 
share wanting one of the three lower ceilings, three quarters (75%) want it to be $100 or below. A 
quarter (25%) of respondents want the maximum $200. By a small margin, the modal ceiling 
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The reasons for the Advisory Council recommending an annual cap at $100 per year are 
worth quoting:  
The council believes that deductibles (where a patient pays 100 per cent of the cost of drugs 
until asset dollar threshold is reached) are likely to deter people from filling their 
prescriptions, and can be particularly hard on patients with chronic conditions. For those 
reasons, we do not support their use. Instead, we support minimal copayments, provided 
they include measures to limit financial hardship, such as an annual cap on how much any 
given household must pay out of pocket. Setting this cap at $100 per year would protect 
households with above-average prescription drug needs and is significantly less than the 
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Policy Objectives and Evaluation Criteria 
  
 
This chapter discusses the main objectives of the policy options considered in this paper and 
outlines criteria and measures that will help achieve the stated objectives, the intention always 
being a commitment to combine what is necessary in the collective interest (social values) with 
what is possible under the prevailing conditions (fiscal constraints).  
8.1  Accessibility for all regardless of income (Effectiveness)  
Since prescription drugs are not included in Canadian medicare for patients not hospitalized, they 
either rely on private insurance arrangements or pay out-of-pocket. Research studies and major 
official reports amply demonstrate that millions of Canadians cannot afford any of the myriad 
provincial or private insurance plans.69  
The principal purpose of a universal single-payer prescription drug program is to bring 
about a change in this situation; it must make sure that Canadians no longer face financial barriers 
that prevent their access to medically necessary prescription drugs. It follows that cost sharing by 
the patients is not the ideal means to finance the public plan. If used, then it should be only a minor 
supplement. Cost sharing could, for example, be limited to ensuring cost-effective use of generic 
drugs in place of brand names. As Dr. Danielle Martin explained before the House Standing 
Committee on Health, zero (or extremely low) cost sharing is necessary because of the persistent 
strong evidence that even small such payments can prevent individuals with low incomes from 
filling their prescriptions.70 As a result millions of Canadians do not adhere to their prescription 
 
69  Health Canada, A Prescription for Canada. Ibid., p.9. 
70  House of Commons Standing Committee on Health, Evidence, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 18 




drugs. Our key objective being to enable all Canadians to fill their prescriptions, the desired 
increase in drug utilization will serve well to indicate the effectiveness of the policy option.   
8.2  Cost reduction or securing ‘value for money’ and Equity  
Canada now spends more on pharmaceutical drugs than on doctors, though somewhat less 
than on hospitals.71 It is the world’s second most expensive country for detail prices of prescription 
drugs. Moreover, Canada has the fastest rising drug costs among OECD countries: more than 10% 
per year. Countries with universal Pharmacare, like France, United Kingdom, Sweden, Australia 
and New Zealand, pay less for their drugs, and their costs increase at a much lower rate.72 For 
instance, the British system achieves prices for patented drugs that are 18% lower than in Canada 
and prices for generic drugs are approximately 30% lower.73 
The main reason prescription drugs are so expensive in Canada is because of the 
importance of private insurers. Insurance companies are normally paid on the basis of a percentage 
of spending, so they have no incentive to reduce costs. Therefore, they make no discrimination 
among drugs, and gladly agree to reimburse new drugs that are more expensive than existing 
cheaper and better drugs.74 
In view of this vital problem, one of the main objectives of the proposed universal 
pharmacare program is to reduce cost-- both by way of reducing unnecessary prescription drug use 
and through an efficient price negotiation with drug manufacturers in order to ensure the right 
value for money in delivering prescription drugs. Accordingly, reducing the regressive 
redistributive impact of drug costs on peoples’ out of pocket spending or bringing equity is an 
indispensable objective of the national pharmacare.    
 
71   House Standing Committee, Pharmacare Now, p. 122; and A Prescription for Canada, p. 150. 
72  Gagnon, M-A., 2010. “Why Canadians need universal pharmacare.” Canadian Centre for Policy 
Alternatives. 
73  Morgan, S. G. et al., “Rethinking Pharmacare in Canada,” Commentary, no. 384, June 2013, 
(Health Policy, C.D. Howe Institute). G. Morgan, Jamie R. Daw R. Law  




8.3  Achieving better administrative efficiency  
Administrative efficiency depends on how smooth is administering the service. The more time or 
human resources and technological support required, the more complex the administrative process 
gets. Hence, each of the policy options will be measured against the degree of complexity it entails.   
As is widely acknowledged, administrative cost of a single payer plan is significantly less 
than the aggregate cost to administer multiple public and private insurance plans. Likewise, 
elimination of cost sharing can result in saving significant extra-costs due to processing patient 
payments. It is well-recognized that the current patchwork system is totally inefficient, and the 
administrative fees are much higher for private than public plans (8% as compared to 2%).75 
Achieving higher efficiency is one of the core objectives of the proposed new plan.  
8.4    Stakeholder and public acceptance  
Patients and their family members, healthcare providers and academics, representatives of 
healthcare organizations, business, labour groups, the pharmaceutical industry, private insurers 
and employee benefit providers all count as stakeholders in implementing a universal national 
plan. Perhaps the most active and influential of all are the healthcare providers as stakeholders, 
because implementation of a pharmacare policy involves their active participation throughout.  
On the other hand, in a federal structure like Canada’s the challenge of bringing most 
provincial opinions in alignment with a national vision is a true barrier. The National 
Pharmaceutical Strategy failed in the past at least in part because of differing views of federal and 
provincial governments.76 Specialists hold misalignment of ideas within governing parties at the 
federal level responsible for the failure of pharmacare proposals get a nod. Institutions of private 
drug coverage also created a concentrated interest group that opposes universal pharmacare in 
Canada.  
 
75  Gagnon, M-A. 2010, ibid. 
76  Morgan, S.G., and K. Boothe. 2016. “Universal prescription drug coverage in Canada: Long-





Public opinion does matter. Following the U.S., fierce opposition to a single-payer 
insurance model is likely from commercial interests.  As with governments everywhere, Canadian 
governments too are unlikely to take on such opponents forcefully, unless there is strong public 
support for doing so.77 The long-standing debate in Canada, spread out well over five-decades, is 
enough evidence that despite a strongly held and shared belief among a majority of Canadians, a 
universal drug coverage plan as component of universal healthcare could not be implemented in 
Canada on account of opposition from small but powerful groups. The proposed policy options 









CHAPTER 9  
Policy Options  
 
In light of our research, encompassing the literature review, results of the survey analysis and of 
the findings from qualitative interviews, I propose the following three broad policy options with 
respect to cost sharing.  
9.1 Policy Option I: No direct patient charges at the point of care  
The policy strategy under this option is a universal single payer public prescription drug coverage 
program inspired by and derived from the original intention of the Canada Health Act, 1984, which 
states as follows: “that continued access to quality health care without financial or other barriers 
will be critical to maintaining and improving the health and well-being of Canadians.”78 This 
option provides a straight alternative to the present provincial systems and private drug insurance 
policies. It entails expansion of the Canada Health Act to include prescription drugs dispensed 
outside of hospitals as an insured service under the Act. 
Under this option, whenever Canadians approach their pharmacy counters with a 
prescription (and proof of eligibility in hand), they would not be required to undertake any cost 
sharing for the medication dispensed to them. Pharmacists will follow a mandatory generic 
substitution policy for essential drugs to make sure patients and prescribers choose the most cost-
effective treatment. The national pharmacare program will need to develop a national strategy for 
expensive drugs for rare diseases. Access to these drugs may be subject to discretionary decisions 









9.2 Policy Option II: Modest cost sharing 
Under this option I consider a special measure of modest cost sharing, close to the minimal 
amounts proposed by the Advisory Council on the Implementation of National Pharmacare, 
subsumed under a universal single-payer public prescription drug coverage program.79 
According to the Advisory Council recommendations, patients would pay no more than $2 
or $5 per prescription depending on the drug group concerned. For instance, a prescription 
containing a straightforward antibiotic will cost $2. And for prescriptions with other expensive 
drugs the amount will be $5. It will include a maximum limit of payment per household not to 
exceed $100 per year. To quote from the report: “The council recommends out of pocket costs for 
all products listed on the national formulary not exceed $5 per prescription, with a copayment of 
$2 for essential medicines and an annual maximum of $100 per household per year to ensure that 
patients face few barriers to access.”80  
It may be noted that the Advisory Council strongly recommended that “all Canadian 
residents be eligible for national pharmacare to ensure everyone has access to the drugs they need 
to maintain their physical and mental health.”81  
9.3 Policy Option III: Emulation of the BC ‘Fair Pharmacare Plan’  
Under this option, all Canadians, including permanent residents are eligible to participate in the 
national pharmacare program. However, there will be cost-sharing based on BC's present formula. 
Families (including single-member households) are subject to an income tested deductible. As is 
known, deductibles are the amounts patients need to spend in a year before the program starts to 
share the burden of their prescription drug costs. They will pay full prescription costs until they 
meet their annual deductible threshold levels.  
After meeting the deductible, the insurance authority pays 70% of the prescription drug 
costs for ‘Regular Assistance’ families, and 75% for ‘Enhanced Assistance’ families (i.e., those 
 
79  Health Canada, A Prescription for Canada, June 2019; Recommendation 8, p. 18 (also, p. 63). 
80  Health Canada, ibid., p.18.; Recommendation 8. 




with a member born before 1940) until they meet their family maximum. The family maximum is 
the annual maximum amount that a family needs to pay toward their eligible drug cost. Once they 
meet the family maximum the program pays 100% of eligible drug costs for the rest of the year. 
The BC program uses the net income from the family members’ income tax returns to calculate a 
family’s level of coverage, i.e., the range of deductibles, limit of the family maximum, and when 







 Policy Criteria and Measures Weighted 
 
 
10.1 Key Objective: Effectiveness 
Increasing patient use of necessary prescription drugs remains the overarching objective of a 
national pharmacare program. The effectiveness of a policy measure will be determined based on 
what impact it will have on the completion of physician-recommended medical drugs.  Based on 
research data, the effectiveness of alternative policy options is measured on the following 5-point 
scale put in an ascending order:  
Very small increase in completion of prescription drug treatment plans relative to 
completion rates prior to introduction of national pharmacare (score 1); 
Small increase (score 2); 
Moderate increase (score 3); 
Large increase (score 4); and 
Very large increase (score 5). 
 
10.2 Gross Cost of National Insurance (Cost to the Government)  
Reducing the cost of unnecessary prescriptions is an integral consideration of any policy options 
for a national prescription drug policy. This criterion is measured on a 3-point scale put in an 
ascending order with larger decline estimates obtaining higher scores: 
Small decline (score 1) (in unnecessary prescriptions); 
Moderate decline (score 2); and 
Large decline (score 3).  
 




What redistributive impact a particular policy option might have is estimated by the redistributive 
income effect of cost-sharing per household relative to a policy of no cost at the point of purchase. 
Measuring the regressive impact of a cost-sharing policy involves the share of low-income families 
on prescription drugs relative to medium and high-income families. The larger the cost-sharing 
option the more regressive a policy becomes, e.g., option I, with no copayments, would have no 
regressive impact, whereas Option III, with cost-sharing resembling the status quo ante in BC, 
would have a significant regressive impact. The scores for this criterion will be measured on a 3-
point scale in a descending order: 
Significant regressive impact (score 1);  
Modest regressive impact (score 2); and 
No regressive impact (score 3). 
10.4 Administrative Efficiency 
The gist of administrative efficiency is to keep the process of administering the service simple and 
well managed. In other words, the more time or human resources (and technological support) 
required, the more complex the administrative process. Complexity matters in a substantial way 
and is inversely related to efficiency. Hence, each of the policy options considered is measured 
against the degree of complexity it entails.  The specific measure being used for administrative 
efficiency here is the estimate of time and other kinds of logistic support required for dispensing 
drugs per prescription: 
‘High complexity/Low efficiency’ (score 1); 
‘Moderate complexity/Moderate efficiency’(score 2); and 
‘Low complexity/High efficiency’ (score 3).  
10.5 Stakeholder and Public Acceptance 
The specific measures for stakeholder acceptance considered here are as follows: 
(i) Acceptability to federal, provincial and territorial governments; 




(iii)  Acceptability to health policy specialists, different interest-groups with a stake in public 
policy and other opinion makers.  
A three-point scale of low acceptance (score 1), moderate acceptance (score 2), and high 
acceptance (score 3). is used to rate acceptability among stakeholders and the general public. 
TABLE 10.1:  Policy Criteria and Measures 
Criteria  Measures  Scoring 




Impact of policy on patient 
completion of prescription 
drug treatment plan (relative to 
patient completion prior to the 





1. Very small increase (in 
completion of prescription 
drug completion plan) 
2. Small increase  
3. Moderate increases  
4. Large increases  
5. Very large increase  
2. Gross cost of national 
insurance to the government 




prescriptions – reducing gross 
cost of national pharmacare 
(relative to "unnecessary 
prescriptions" prior to the 
introduction of national 
pharmacare) 
 
1. Small decrease (in volume 
of unnecessary prescriptions) 
2. Medium decrease  
3. Large decrease  
 
 
3. Redistributive impact  
[In terms of cost to the 
households] 
 
Estimated regressive impact of 
the proposed insurance policy 
on patient income  
 1. Significant regressive 
impact 




[Change in the amount of 
annual household spending on 
prescription drugs] 
3.  No regressive impact 
4. Administrative efficiency  
 
Amount of time and other 
logistic support required for 
dispensing drugs per 
prescription  
1. High complexity  
2. Moderate complexity 
3. Low complexity  
 
5. Stakeholder acceptance 
 
Acceptability to Federal, 
Provincial (and Territorial) 
governments, Health care 
professionals, public policy 
analysts, interest groups, 
political parties and other 




1.  Low acceptance 
2. Moderate acceptance  
3. High acceptance 





Acceptability to the public at 
large 
 
1.  Low acceptance 
2. Moderate acceptance  








Analysis of Policy Options  
 
 
In this chapter, the policy options are analyzed, on the basis of the criteria and measures discussed 
in the preceding chapters. The policy matrix at the end of this chapter (see Table 11.1) provides an 
overview of the analysis. 
11.1 Analysis of Option I: No direct patient charges at the point of care  
This policy option imposes no financial barrier to get access to prescribed drugs. Studies in various 
jurisdictions show that direct patient charges can result in patients not taking their necessary 
medication prescribed. Evidence-based studies, both Canadian and international, have amply 
demonstrated that removal of cost-barriers leads to increases in prescription drug utilization. 
For instance, one study shows that elimination of co-payments in the Ontario Drug Benefit 
Plan for seniors at age 65 increased drug use. 82 Increases in drug use were concentrated primarily 
among individuals with lower levels of health status. Most of the increased occurred among 
individuals under physician supervision, which indicates that removing cost-barriers enabled those 
patients to fill their unfilled prescriptions.  
The Advisory Council on the Implementation of the National Pharmacare estimated that 
removing out-of-pocket costs for medications used to treat just three health problems (diabetes, 
cardiovascular diseases, and chronic respiratory conditions) would result in up to 220,000 fewer 
emergency room visits and 90,000 fewer hospital stays annually, leading to a saving of $1.2 
billion.83 In light of these research findings, it is highly likely that no cost sharing at the point of 
 
82  Grootendorst, Paul V., Bernie J. O'Brien and Geoffrey M. Anderson, ‘On Becoming 65 in Ontario: 
Effects of Drug Plan Eligibility on Use of Prescription Medicines,’ Medical Care, vol. 35, no. 4 
(Apr., 1997), pp. 386-398. 
83  Tamblyn, R., Bartlett, S., Thavorn, K., Weir, D. & Habib, B. (2019). Burden and Health Care 




care will result in a very large measure of increase in patients filling their prescriptions. Therefore, 
effectiveness of this policy on raising prescription drug use is scored 5/5.   
There is good evidence that over-prescribing is taking place.84 However, there is little 
evidence to suggest this can be addressed by cost-sharing. There are contradictory arguments on 
the extent to which no cost-sharing leads to physicians prescribing unnecessarily and patients 
requesting prescriptions unnecessarily. One stream of experts bases their argument on the 
assumption of demand-side moral hazard in health insurance. This assumes that patients are 
consuming health services beyond their needs. Empirical research on patient cost-sharing in 
Europe and elsewhere concludes that evidence for demand-side moral hazard is meagre. Clinical 
studies suggest that the great majority of health insurance beneficiaries do not aim to abuse the 
public healthcare system.85 Cost reduction by decreasing the number of unnecessary prescription 
drugs will fundamentally rely on the overall effectiveness of educational programs addressing the 
overprescribing by physicians and inappropriate patient requests for prescriptions. 
Two appropriate quotations from the qualitative interviews conducted for this capstone 
illustrate the sharp contradiction introduced above. For one respondent (R002), “ ‘Moral hazard’ 
carries a high degree of importance, definitely! Moral hazard is real and very, very important to 
consider and mitigate against.” Another respondent (R003), however, takes a very different stand: 
“‘Moral hazard’ is of very minor importance. I have heard this argument used against reform in 
the past, but in my view, the evidence suggests that it is not actually much of an issue.”  
 As noted above, the Advisory Council rightly estimated, adopting this option will save 
billions of dollars for the government by reducing hospitalization and other serious intervention in 
treatment procedure. However, assessing the chance of ‘moral hazard’ coming into play, this 
 
Conditions in Canada (a report prepared for the Advisory Council on the Implementation of 
National Pharmacare). Available from Health Canada on request. 
84          See, this capstone, Chapter 4.2, supra. 
85  Holst, J. (2010). “Patient Cost Sharing – Reforms without Evidence: Theoretical Considerations 
and Empirical Findings from Industrialized Countries,” trans. Meredith Dale, Discussion Paper 





policy option is judged to account for only a very small decrease or no decrease at all in 
unnecessary prescription drug use and the option scores 0/3.  
In terms of redistributive impact, as this option imposes no burden of direct cost-sharing 
on patients, it will have no regressive impact on the household costs of drug spending, which 
awards this option the score of 3/3. 
A prescription drug program that doesn’t include any payment at the point of delivery of 
prescription drugs doesn’t seem to create any complexity either. It will keep the administering 
process less time consuming for pharmacists, requiring less logistics, accounting procedures, and 
other administrative support services compared to options that require cost sharing arrangements. 
The process is likely to be pretty smooth. Thus, it is scored 3/3 for low complexity.   
The acceptance of this policy option among a spectrum of stakeholders is likely to be 
somewhat mixed. Nationalizing standards for a policy like pharmacare will require considerable 
cooperation between federal and provincial (and territorial) governments. Negotiation and 
consensus on the specific terms of a universal pharmacare remain uncertain. Apart from that, 
certain groups of healthcare professionals (such as Doctors for Medicare) are eloquently vocal 
about adopting a policy option for the national pharmacare that would be based on the patients’ 
health needs and certainly not their ability to pay. However, the Canadian Medical Association 
(CMA) has not yet been vocal on any particular policy option. Historically, the CMA opposed the 
idea of a national pharmacare in the healthcare system.86 Overall, stakeholder acceptance of this 
policy is considered moderate and scored 2/3.   
Public acceptance of this policy option, nevertheless, seems to be high as an extensive 
survey conducted in October 2020 by Angus Reid Institute shows.
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 According to the survey, a 
 
86  Marchildon, G. P., “Private Finance and Canadian Medicare: Learning from History,” in Flood, C. 
M.  and B. Thomas, eds., Is Two-Tier Health Care the Future? (Ottawa: University of Ottawa 
Press, 2020), pp. 15-35. 
87  Angus Reid, ‘Access for all: Near Universal Support for a Pharmacare Plan Covering Canadian’s 




clear majority of those participating expressed their moral support for such a policy that provide 
easy, unhindered access to the prescription drugs or to include medicine to Medicare.    
Figure 11.1  Public opinion on access to prescription drugs without cost-barrier 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Source: Angus Reid (October 29, 2020), Access for all: Near universal support for a 
pharmacare plan covering Canadians’ prescription drug costs. 
 
Considering the overall situation this policy option is judged to gain high public 
acceptance. Thus, it is scored 3/3 here.  
11.2 Analysis of Policy Option II: Modest copayments 
Under this policy option the recommended copayments are no more than $100 per year, which 
will obviously bring about a steep reduction in current out-of-pocket expenditure on prescription 
drugs.88 Moreover, people living on social assistance, government disability benefits, or the federal 
Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) are exempt from all copayments. Thus, this option will 
increase the prescription drug usage compared to the current situation. However, even a modest 
copayment may constitute a significant barrier for many lower-income people who are not on some 
form income assistance.  
 




As mentioned previously in Chapter 4, above, experts and practising doctors testifying 
before the House Standing Committee reiterated that even very small co-payments can prevent 
individuals with relatively low incomes from filling their prescriptions.89 Empirical research, both 
Canadian and international, as discussed in Chapter 3.2, above, shows that even small direct patient 
charges can result in patients not taking their medically necessary medication. For instance, a study 
rigorously examining the evidence regarding effects of copayments on drug expenditures, 
appropriateness of drug utilization, and the efficiency with which prescription drug markets 
operate in Canada concluded that, although copayments can reduce drug program expenditures, 
they do so only by compromising the major program goals.90 Thus, the effectiveness of this 
program is scored as 4/5.  
As discussed in the previous policy option considering the moral hazard that may arise 
from a universal pharmacare program with no cost-sharing this option with modest cost sharing 
may account for modest reduction in unnecessary prescription drug consumption as well. 
Therefore, on this criterion this option is scored as a modest reduction of 2/3.  
Likewise, the redistributive impact of this policy is projected to have a minor regressive 
impact on peoples’ income as previously explained in the chapter 10.3. Hence, this policy option 
with modest co-payments is scored as 2.5/3.  
In assessing the administrative complexity, collecting different amounts of co-payments 
for different types of drugs will involve additional administrative work. This will no doubt add 
complexity to the process relative to a policy of no payment at the point of receiving the prescribed 
drugs. However, since it doesn’t require different types of payments, e.g., percentage calculation 
for co-insurance or other detailed elements, this policy option will not likely to add a major 
complexity. Hence, it is scored a somewhat low complexity of 2.5/3.    
 
89   Vide, Pharmacare Now, pp. 65-70. 
90  Hurley, J. and N.A. Johnson, “The Effects of Co-Payments within Drug Reimbursement 








Since this policy option strikes a balance between no direct cost sharing and high cost sharing, 
only this option provides a middle ground among stakeholders in decision making to come to a 
desired level of consensus. This is somewhat reflected in both my qualitative findings and 
quantitative survey (Chapters 6 and 7). Therefore, this policy option is scored as a 3/3 on the 
stakeholder acceptance.  
 
However, in terms of public acceptance this option scores a modest figure of 2/3 as it puts a cost 
barrier that a greater number of Canadians do not seem to support as shown in many opinion 
surveys, past and present, including in the most recent one by Angus Reid referred in a previous 
section. 
11.3 Analysis of Policy Option III: Emulation of the BC ‘Fair PharmaCare Plan’ 
This policy option implies that the national pharmacare plan will adopt the current structure of 
BC’s Fair PharmaCare Plan. It entails a deductible (paying the full cost) and a percentage of cost-
sharing for expenditures above the deductible. All three elements, i.e., the deductible threshold, 
co-insurance, and family maximum cost-sharing, are based on the patients’ family income. The 
effectiveness of this option will essentially depend on how much national bargaining under 
Pharmacare would reduce drug-costs. As discussed above, as patient's cost sharing rates rise, the 
prescription drug completion rate goes down. This option is not likely to generate a large increase 
in prescription drug use. Hence, this policy option on effectiveness is scored as a 2/5.      
Some experts strongly suggest that cost-sharing effectively addresses the ‘moral hazard’ 
associated with unnecessary prescriptions. Since this option will require the patients to pay more 
out-of-pocket than under the two other options, it may decrease a relatively large amount of 
unnecessary prescription drugs and thus make a contribution to cost reduction for the government. 
Therefore, this policy on cost reduction scored (comparative to two other options) high as 3/3.  
In assessing the redistributive impact, as discussed above, the larger the cost sharing the 
more regressive the policy becomes. Therefore, this policy scores quite low on this criterion, as it 




This policy, as explained above, consists of multiple elements includes all three cost-sharing 
elements (deductible, co-insurance, and family maximum), which also vary for every patient 
depending on the family income. It is understandable that this option will make the administrative 
process a good deal more complex as compared to the two other options. Hence, in assessing the 
complexity in administrative management, this policy is scored 1/3.   
Whether stakeholders will receive favourably the scaling up to the national level of a 
provincial formula is pretty much uncertain. Compared to other proposed options this option thus 
scores a 1/3 in terms of stakeholder acceptance across the country. A policy option that emulates 
an existing drug plan with minor reform will probably not look impressive to the general public. 
In the recent nationwide survey, BC and Atlantic Canada show the highest levels of access 
problems (29% and 26% respectively).91 Thus, in terms of public acceptance this policy option 













91  Angus Reid, ‘Access for All: Near Universal Support for a Pharmacare Plan Covering Canadians’ 





TABLE 11.1: Summary of Policy Evaluation 
Criteria No Direct Patient 
Charges at the Point 
of Care (Option 1) 
Modest Co-Payment 
(Option 2) 
Emulation of BC 
‘Fair PharmaCare 
Plan’ (Option 3) 
Effectiveness 
(increase in 
prescription drug use) 
(max= 5) 
Very large increase 
 (5) 
Large increase  
(4)   
Small increase  
(2) 
Redistributive 
Impact (max= 3) 
 








Cost Reduction (due 
to unnecessary 
prescriptions) 
(max = 3) 













High complexity  
(1)  
Stakeholder 
Acceptance (max= 3) 
























To move forward towards a universal single payer public prescription drug coverage program in 
Canada, demands doing more than merely addressing coverage gaps. The ultimate goal of a 
recommended policy is striking an efficient balance between better health outcomes and better 
cost control.  
Even if the Policy Option I (with no copayments) scores higher, i.e., performs better in 
objective terms, especially on account of its addressing the fundamental objective of effectively 
securing necessary prescription drugs for all, thus ensuring improved health status and quality of 
life for all Canadians, it is quite unlikely that this option is going to be accepted by all critical 
stakeholders in policy-making and implementing it.  
Given the vital problem of consensus-building between the federal and provincial 
(including territorial) governments on the one hand and, on the other hand, among policy makers, 
business, and all other stakeholders some pragmatism is called for in reaching a workable policy 
take off. Therefore, I recommend Policy Option II, admittedly, involving a measure of modest 
copayments which it strikes a just balance between the outlying options considered, namely the 
one (i) with no direct patient charges, and the other (ii) emulating one of the incumbent provincial 
plans which entails high out-of-pocket-spending similar to average existing plans. Policy Option 
II can be also considered some sort of consensus by compromise between our two extreme 
options. Taking all considerations into account, this seems to be the best overall and the only 
feasible option at least for the near future.  
It is understandable that the Advisory Council extensively assessed the trade-offs involved 
and the overall benefits of a universal system to replace the existing patchwork system, which is 
both costly and regressive, and which leaves millions behind. The benefits of a universal public 
system proposed by the Advisory Council outweighs the burden of a modest cost-barrier it intends 




payer, public system of healthcare with no cost barriers. Most worrisome is the concern that the 
system is now approaching the breaking point for a panoply of reasons (rapidly rising drug costs 
among them), which lie beyond the scope of this thesis. In the current conjuncture, a modest 
copayment is perhaps justifiable for making a universal public system of prescription drugs 
program possible in Canada, a desideratum long overdue for decades now.  
As an integral part of this strategy, I would recommend Health Canada launch an education 
program for physicians on appropriate prescribing practices to understand the harm caused by 
excessive use of pharmaceutical treatment. (See Appendix 2.) The program is also expected to 
make aware the general public, patients in particular, on equivalence of generics to brand drugs 
and benefits of using generics and biosimilars in order to save money and to keep the insurance 
program affordable. The experts for the program will negotiate performance-based financing 
agreements with the drug manufacturers in order to ensure better value for money.  
As part of this policy, all jurisdictional governments need to actively co-operate in this 
process of maintaining an oversight mechanism and regulating appropriate prescribing by carefully 
regulating all manners of pharmaceutical industry payments to prescribers and other 
healthcare providers, institutions and patient groups, with a mandatory requirement for 





Chapter 13  
Conclusion  
In conclusion I would like to reiterate that my study analyzes a set of primary data collected 
by both quantitative survey and qualitative interviews. I also analyze secondary data culled from 
the latest information available and apply both qualitative and quantitative methods of data 
analysis in processing the relevant data. My recommendation is, in part, derived from the findings 
of my primary survey data where the modal option favored a small copayment. Their choice, as I 
take it, is motivated by a concern for building a nationwide consensus for a universal pharmacare 
in Canada.   
The similarity between the Council’s position and the outcome of my study is coincidental. 
The methods I applied are substantially different. In comparing the two contending policy 
options, (between  ‘no cost-sharing’ Option 1 and ‘modest cost-sharing’ Option 2 at the point of 
filling prescriptions), I found that the overarching objective of the universal prescription drug plan, 
i.e., increasing prescription drug use, is better served with no direct cost-sharing at the point of 
dispensing prescription drugs.  
However, given the Canadian historical perspective, reaching a consensus among myriad 
stakeholders is an indispensable condition to end the status quo and let the prospective universal 
prescription drug plan take off. In the end, that became my determining factor for recommending 
a modest cost-sharing, with the sole objective of securing a consensus among stakeholders. My 
substantial reasons for endorsing the provision for modest direct copayment are, however, 
fundamentally different from those of the Advisory Council’s on an important respect. The 
Council agrees, on the one hand, that “there is little evidence that ‘free’ prescription medicines 
lead to overuse, abuse or wastage” and that direct out-of-pocket costs at the point of dispensing 
drugs contribute to “creating a financial barrier” for patients. It also admits “collecting user fees 
will add to the cost of running pharmacare.”  On the other hand, notwithstanding these arguments, 
the Council opts for copayments.92 I respectfully disagree with the reason the Council adduces. To 
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stress perceived ‘moral hazard’ is not an overarching concern; but by all accounts, inaccessibility 
to medically necessary prescription drugs is the major concern.  
 








DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF PROVINCIAL PRESCRIPTION DRUG PLANS   
British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec 
 
1.1 British Columbia: Family-income-based Voluntary Plan 
British Columbia’s prescription drug insurance plan, Fair PharmaCare, has been in operation since 
2003. Under this plan families (including single member families) are subject to an income-based 
deductible, a percentage of shared payment (once the deductible has been met), and an annual out 
of-pocket maximum. There are no deductibles and family maximum when income is $13,750 or 
less. As a proportion of income, deductibles range up to $10,000 per family.93 
It is a voluntary program under which any resident may receive public subsidy for costs 
exceeding deductibles determined by income. The plan incorporates other criteria to include 
people with special eligibilities and needs. Once a family has spent approximately 2% of its net 
income on prescription drugs or related costs, Fair PharmaCare pays for 100% of any subsequent 
costs for the rest of the year. The plan also offers coverage to families with higher incomes but 
requires them to first pay out-of-pocket for drug costs (up to 2–3% of their income) before any 
plan coverage begins.94 
British Columbia currently offers altogether eight public drug insurance plans for its 
residents who are active Medical Services Plan (MSP) holders.95 Eligibility criteria vary for each 
plan. The eight existing plans are as follows:    
(a) Fair PharmaCare (for most of the BC residents) 
 
93            Government of British Columbia, Fair PharmaCare, 
https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/health/health-drug-coverage/pharmacare-for-bc-
residents/who-we-cover/fair-pharmacare-plan/fair-pharmacare-changes-in-2019 
94  Barua, B., et al., Provincial Drug Coverage for Vulnerable Canadians (Fraser Institute, 2018), p. 
iii. 




(b) Plan B (for residents of licensed residential care facilities) 
(c) Plan C (for individuals receiving income assistance) 
(d) Plan D (for individuals registered with a provincial cystic fibrosis clinic) 
(e) Plan F (for children receiving medical or full financial assistance through the ‘At 
Home Program of the Ministry of Children and Family Development’) 
(f) Plan G (for mental health patients who can’t afford the cost of medication for 
treatment) 
(g) Plan P (for those who choose to receive palliative care at home) 
(h) Plan W (for First Nations Health Benefits). 
Fair Pharmacare is the largest of BC plans. Reimbursement under this plan is based on net 
family income guided by the principle—"the lower a family’s income, the more help they 
receive.”96 The three main components of the plan are (1) deductibles (2) co-insurance and (3) a 
maximum out-of-pocket spending limits (based on the net family income). A family’s deductible 
is the amount required to be spent each year by the family before Fair PharmaCare starts to work 
with the co-insurance and rest of the cost.  
Under the plan a registered family pays full prescription drug costs until it meets the 
deductible during a calendar year (January-December). Once a family meets the deductible, 
PharmaCare pays 70% of the eligible cost of a drug for regular assistance families and 75% 
for enhanced assistance families (those with at least one member born before 1940) until they 
reach their family maximum. The family maximum is the annual amount that a family pays toward 
eligible drug costs. After the family maximum is reached, PharmaCare will pay 100% of eligible 
drug costs for the rest of the calendar year.  
Since January 1, 2019, ‘regular assistance’ families earning up to $45,000 per year have 
lower deductibles and/or family maximums. ‘Enhanced assistance’ families earning up to $13,750 
per year have no deductible or family maximum. For a family with net income up to $30,000 there 
is no deductible and a lower family maximum—Fair PharmaCare pays 70% of eligible prescription 
costs right away. A lower deductible amount and a lower family maximum apply to all families 
 




with net income above $30,000 but below $41,667. In case of families with income below $45,000 
but above $41,667 a lower family maximum applies. 97 
All British Columbia residents are eligible for plan coverage, provided they have (a) 
Medical Services Plan (MSP) and (b) give the plan authorities permission to check their income 
(for the last two years) with the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA). A family, for the purposes of the 
plan, is either a single person, or a couple (‘couple’ defined as ‘married or common-law’ couple), 
or a single person with children, or a couple with children (‘dependent children’).  
1.2  Alberta: Premium-based Comprehensive Voluntary Plan Model 
Alberta offers ten different drug coverage programs98 including (1) a premium-based non-group 
coverage plan available to all Albertans under age 65 years and their dependents; (2) a premium-
free coverage for seniors plan available to Albertans 65 years and older and their dependents; 
(3) a palliative coverage plan for people diagnosed as being palliative and receiving treatments 
at home; and  (4) an optical assistance for seniors plan for low-to-moderate income seniors to 
receive financial assistance for optical services.99 Alberta plans, in general, are voluntary 
premium-based plans with comprehensive drug coverage involving no patient charges (except for 
the non-group one) at the point of prescription care.100 
Albertans under 65 (and their dependents) have access to the Non-Group coverage plan 
sponsored by the provincial government (run by Alberta Blue Cross). Individuals and families are 
charged monthly premiums based on income and family arrangements. Under the Non-Group 
 
97  Government of British Columbia, Fair PharmaCare, ibid. 
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Health, Drug Coverage and Supplementary Health Benefits;   https://mssociety.ca/support-
services/programs-and-services/588/drug-coverage-and-supplementary-health-benefits-alberta-
health 





coverage plan families (with children), a family with income less than $39,250 pays a monthly 
premium of $82.60 to access the plan. Prescription drugs covered under the Non-Group program 
are subject to a 30 percent copayment to a maximum of $25 per prescription. There is no deductible 
for coverage, nor is there an out-of-pocket maximum.  Higher-income families can also access this 
program paying higher premiums. Lower-income families (also those with additional covered 
circumstances such as pregnancy, high ongoing prescription needs, and disability) are exempted 
from premiums and co-payments for many prescription drugs as well as some over-the-counter 
products. 
 Subject to meeting certain eligibility criteria, Alberta Seniors Benefit offers some added 
benefits. To be eligible one must, (i) be a Canadian citizen or permanent resident, (ii) be 65 years 
(or older), (iii) have lived in Alberta for at least three months immediately before applying and (iv) 
be receiving OAS (Old Age Security) pension. In general, a single senior with an annual income 
of $28,785 or less (and senior couples with a combined annual income of $46,745 or less) may be 
eligible for a benefit. These income levels are, however, guidelines only and are limited to seniors 
whose income includes full OAS (Old Age Security) pension. The amount of eligible is determined 
by factors including (i) the person’s income, combined with spouse/partner's income, regardless 
of age, (ii) on receiving federal OAS pension (i.e., on living in Canada for 10 years), (iii) the 
person’s accommodation category and (iv)  her/his marital/cohabitation status.101 
Comprehensive drug-benefits are provided to seniors. Age-tested and income-tested drug 
benefits for children in low-income families are also available.  Alberta seniors (and their 
spouses/interdependent partners and dependents) are eligible for the Coverage for Seniors Benefit. 
Alberta Blue Cross administers the program coverage and claims, while Alberta Health manages 
eligibility and registration. It offers the same drug coverage as the Non-Group Coverage plan. 
However, seniors do not have to pay a monthly premium.102 
 
 
101  Government of Alberta, Family and social supports: Seniors: Financial assistance for seniors: 
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Table 1: Premiums for Non-Group Coverage, Alberta 103 
Family Type Income Monthly Premium 
Single 
 
< $20,970  
> $20,970  
$44.45 
$63.50 
Family without Children 
 
< $33,240  
> $33,240  
$82.60 
$118.00 
Family with Children 
 
< $39,250  





Among the provinces, Alberta provides the most generous level of public drug coverage. 
A family with four children, for example, would qualify for the lower premium provided its family 
income is below $39,250. In comparison British Columbia offers a higher range of benefits (i.e., 
no deductible or family maximum) to a family with net income of $13,750).104 However, strictly 
speaking, the two provincial plans are not comparable (as they offer different kinds of benefits). 
Alberta also offers a number of programs specially designed for low-income individuals and 
families, as well as other vulnerable populations. The Alberta Adult Health Benefit Program is 
available to low-income Albertan’s who fulfil certain criteria (such as those who are pregnant, 
have high ongoing prescription needs, are refugees or refugee claimants, or are leaving the Income 
Support program or the Assured Income for the Severely Handicapped Program).105 Children 
living in low income families are eligible for the Child Health Benefit.106  
These two programs cover, among other things, the full cost of many prescription drugs 
and some over-the-counter products with no premiums or cost sharing requirements. Where a 
 
103    Government of Alberta, Department of Health, Health Services and Benefits: Drug Coverage and 
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child, adult, or member of the household already has coverage through another plan, these 
programs may help cover the remaining costs. Eligibility to avail of these plans is determined by 
family arrangement and income (Table 2). 
Table 2: Coverage for Low Income Albertans (including children) 107 
Family Type Maximum Qualifying Income 
Single adult  $16,580 
1 adult + 1 child $26,023 
1 adult + 2 children $31,010 
1 adult + 3 children $36,325 
1 adult + 4 children* $41,957 
Couple, no children $23,212 
Couple + 1 child $31,237 
Couple + 2 children $36,634 
Couple + 3 children $41,594 
Couple + 4 children* $46,932 
* To be added $4,973 to qualifying income for each additional child. 
Albertans severely handicapped and on social assistance receive full coverage for drugs 
with no premiums or cost sharing.108 There is also a program offered for those receiving palliative 
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care at home, which has a 30 percent co-payment to a maximum of $25, with a $1,000 lifetime 
maximum.109  Finally, there are programs that provide high-cost drugs to treat a subset of 
conditions including HIV, cancer, cystic fibrosis, organ transplants, intraocular disease, and 
others.110  The province’s special drug coverage programs include an Outpatient Cancer Drug 
Benefit Program that covers some medications used to treat cancer at no cost to patients and a 
Specialized High Cost Drug Program with coverage for drugs used in highly specialized 
procedures like organ transplants and major heart surgery. In addition, the Retina Anti-Vascular 
Endothelial Growth Factor Program for Intraocular Disease (RAPID) provides coverage for 
Avastin, Lucentis and Eylea, drugs that are used to slow down loss of vision and the Insulin Pump 
Therapy Program is designed for Albertans who have Type I or Type III diabetes and covers the 
cost of an insulin pump and associated supplies.111 Many disease modifying drugs for multiple 
sclerosis are eligible for special authorization to be covered by the ministry's supplementary 
health benefit programs.112 
1.3 Ontario: Age-based and Income-tested Voluntary Plan Model 
 
109   Government of Alberta, Department of Health, Palliative Coverage Program. Government of 
Alberta, no date; http://www.health.alberta.ca/services/drugs-palliativecare.html 
110   Government of Alberta, Department of Health, Specialized High Cost Drug Program. 
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The Ontario system of prescription drug insurance plan is “a hybrid of comprehensive coverage 
for seniors and income-based coverage for all others”.113 The current system of Ontario’s drug 
insurance emphasizes both age and civil-status of the person in determining both the amounts of 
deductibles and co-payments.114 Taking into account their ages and income levels, seniors are 
distributed into four groups: 
(a) Single senior with income above $19,300 
(b) Senior couple with combined income above $32,300 
(c) Single senior with income of $19,300 or less 
(d) Senior couple with combined income of $32,300 or less. 
A person qualifies for the Ontario Drug Benefit (ODB) program on turning 65. With the 
ODB a person age 65 or older pays a portion of prescription-drug costs based on her/his after-tax 
annual income and civil status. One can get coverage as a single senior (including widowed 
spouses) or as a couple (includes spouses who are married, same-sex or common-law partners). A 
single person age 65 or older with a yearly after-tax income above $19,300 pays the first $100 of 
total prescription costs each program year (August 1-July 31, the following year). Once 
prescription expenses exceed the deductible, he or she pays a co-payment, up to $6.11 for each 
prescription, whether filled or refilled. 
In the case of a couple (where at least one person is 65 or older) the $100 deductible is 
payable if the combined income exceeds $32,300. Otherwise, the plan is identical with the 
program describe in the previous paragraph. A single senior, with an annual after-tax income 
of $19,300 or less, has to make a copayment of up to $2 for each prescription drug–filled or 
refilled–but need not pay a deductible. A senior couple (where at least one person is 65 or older), 
with a combined annual income of $32,300 or less (after taxes), each senior is eligible for benefits 
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and has to make a copayment of up to $2 for each prescription drug–filled or refilled –but need 
not pay a deductible. 
There are exemptions for vulnerable groups. Some become eligible before reaching 65 if 
they are living in long-term care-home or home for special care or in a Community Home for 
Opportunity. Others also become eligible if they are 24 or younger and not covered by a private 
insurance plan or are receiving professional home and community care services or receiving 
benefits from special social assistance plans (such as ‘Ontario Works’ or ‘Ontario Disability 
Support Program’ or enrolled in the ‘Trillium Drug Program’). People living in one of the home 
types are automatically covered by the ODB program. They have a copayment (up to $2 for each 
drug filled or refilled)–but need not pay a deductible. Those who are 24 or under and are living in 
these homes have no copayment either. 
Those who receive professional home and community care services arranged through 
their ‘Local Health Integration Network’ are automatically covered by ODB. They make a $2 co-
payment for each prescription filled or refilled, but do not have to pay a deductible. People 24 
years and under (with no private insurance or beneficiaries of professional home and community 
care services) do not have to pay the $2 for each prescription filled or refilled. People who are 
receiving benefits from ‘Ontario Works’ or ‘Ontario Disability Support Program’ are 
automatically covered by the ODB. They pay up to $2 for each prescription filled or refilled – and 
do not pay a deductible. To register for the income-based program, non-seniors in Ontario are 
obliged to declare that they do not have private health insurance or that their private insurance does 
not cover 100 per cent of their prescription drug costs.115  
Provinces with public prescription drug coverage for seniors (65 and above)–like Ontario 
and the Atlantic provinces–have lately been under pressure as the changing age-structure of their 
population began to swell up the senior population and to their insurance liability. Concerned 
 




specialists think that recognition of this pending liability has motivated Ontario, among others, to 
replace age-based programs with universal income-based drug coverage.116 
1.4 Québec: Statutory Multi-Payer Drug Plan Model  
Québec has achieved universal drug coverage by making drug insurance mandatory for all 
residents, “by giving priority to private plans.” 117 The province requires residents not covered by 
private group insurance to enroll in the government drug insurance plan run by RAMQ (Régie de 
l'assurance maladie du Québec).118 Persons receiving public assistance (including the 
unemployed), newborn children whose parents already have coverage and seniors 65 and above 
are covered by the government scheme. Insured individuals must pay premiums subject to a scaled 
subsidy. Monthly deductibles and copayments apply for adults to a monthly maximum, while 
prescriptions for those under the age of eighteen are not subject to copayment. 
Two types of plans provide coverage: private plans (group insurance or employee benefit) 
and the public plan, managed by RAMQ. All permanent residents eligible for a private plan must 
join that plan and provide coverage under it for their spouse and children. Only those persons who 
are not eligible for a private plan (if they are unemployed or employed in a position without 
benefits) may register for the PPDI (Public Prescription Drug Insurance) plan. In general, every 
resident pays an annual premium to ‘Revenue Québec’ for coverage under the PPDI plan. The 
premium is variable, ranging from $0 to $636 per person, based on the annual rates in effect, is 
established according to the person’s situation and net family income. It is payable even if a person 
does not purchase any prescription drugs. Rates are adjusted annually on July 1 and collected by 
the ‘Revenue Québec’. The PPDI plan requires that beneficiaries, in addition to annual premiums 
 
116   Morgan, S.G. and Coombes, M.  ‘Income-based Drug Coverage in British Columbia: 
Toward an Understanding of   the Policy,’ Healthcare Policy (2006), 2(2): 92-108; cited 
Morgan, S.G. et al. (2013), at p. 4. 
117    Health Canada, ibid., p.34. 





at a variable rate from $0 to $636, pay at the pharmacy monthly deductibles of $21.75 (previously 
$16.25) and 37 per cent coinsurance (previously 32%). 
The Québec plan limits patient charges with monthly out-of-pocket maximum 
contribution per adult in a household. Amount payable for covered drugs is either $93.08 per 
month or $1,117 per year.  Exceptions include persons 65 or over receiving 1%-93% of the GIS 
(Guaranteed Income Supplement) for whom the annual amount payable now is $649 or $54.08 
monthly. Children under 18, full-time students aged 18 to 25 (not married and living with 
parents, or without access to a private plan through a student job or otherwise) and persons with 
a functional impairment or on social assistance get medications free. Revenue Québec collects 
the annual premium through income tax returns. Everyone has to pay the public plan premium 
for every full month during which one had no coverage under a private plan.  


















Persons 18-64 $0 - $616 $19.90 34.9% $90.58 $1,087 
Seniors (no GIS) $0 - $616 $19.90 34.9% $90.58 $1,087 
Seniors (GIS 1%- 
93%) 
$0 - $616 $19.90 34.9% $53.16 $638 
Seniors (GIS 94%-
100%) and people 
with a claim slip 
from Ministaire du 
Travail, de 
l’Emploi et la 
Solidarité Social 





However, there are exemptions for some. They are generally covered, free of charge, by 
the PPDI Plan. Three kinds of people are considered eligible for the PPDI plan, namely (1) persons 
 




without access to a private plan; (2) persons aged 65 and over but have not joined a private plan; 
(3) recipients of last-resort financial assistance.  
‘Last-resort financial assistance’ is a Québec government program providing financial 
support to persons with limited resources. A person receiving ‘last-resort financial assistance’ 
benefits is automatically registered for the PPDI plan when his or her file is created and the 
opportunity is also available to certain other holders of claim slips. The Guaranteed Income 
Supplement (GIS) is a monthly benefit added to the Old Age Security (OAS) pension among low-
income seniors. Prescription drug insurance plans set out a rate based on the amount of the 
supplement received. This rate establishes whether or not one qualifies for medications free of 
charge under the PPDI plan. The working of the plan is illustrated below by a scheme and a 
numerical example. 
Table 4: Québec Resident’s Contribution Explained 
Prescription cost 
Prescription drug cost + Pharmacist’s professional 
fee 
− Contribution by insured person 
Monthly deductible + patient’s portion of the co-
insurance 
(until resident reaches her/his maximum monthly 
contribution) 
= Amount to be paid by the insurer 
Cost paid by RAMQ for prescription drugs covered 
by the public plan 
The payment of a prescription of $60, for example, is apportioned at the pharmacy on the 
first day of the month in the following way: for a total prescription cost of $60, the resident first 
pays the deductible of $21.75. Then on the remaining $38.25, she/he pays her/his portion of the 
co-insurance, amounting to $14.15. In the end, she/he pays $35.90 ($21.75 + $14.15) of the $60 
invoice.  
Table 5: Apportioning Prescription Drug Costs in Quebec 




− Deductible (set amount payable) − $21.75 
− Remainder to be paid = $38.25 
Co-insurance Patient: $38.25 × 37% = $14.15 
RAMQ: $38.25 − $14.15 = $24.10 
 
It may be noted that even if the deductible is $21.75, a resident need not pay this amount 
for her/his first purchase if the cost of the prescription is less than the deductible. This means 
that, if the first prescription costs $8, the remainder of the deductible will be payable when the 
resident makes his/her next purchases, if applicable.120 
1.5  Conclusion: A snapshot of myriad cost-sharing schemes under provincial plans  
In the four provincial models discussed above several different types of cost-sharing schemes are 
encountered: deductibles, co-payments and coinsurance, premiums and plan maximum limits 
or out-of-pocket spending limits.  Based on the most crucial element, i.e., patient charges, a 
comparative picture of the three select models is shown below in the Table 6. 
Table 6: Varieties of Patient Charges in Select Models 




insurance only for 
Non-group coverage) 






Deductibles are what an individual (or household) has to pay out-of-pocket (annually or 
monthly) on prescription drugs before the plan is activated. A premium is a fixed amount (monthly 
or annual) that an individual or household must pay to enroll in a drug insurance plan. This amount 
 






is payable whether or not any claims are made. Co-payments and coinsurance (which have to 
be paid only after the deductible limit has been reached) are amounts paid out-of-pocket by an 
individual or a household each time a prescription is filled, while the remainder is paid by the plan. 
Coinsurance refers to a percentage amount (e.g., coinsurance of 20% of the prescription cost) 
whereas co-payment is a fixed payment per prescription (e.g., co-payment of $5 per prescription). 
Plan maximum is the maximum amount a plan contributes to an individual’s (or a household’s) 
prescription drug costs—this can be either an annual or a lifetime maximum– and decides the out-
of-pocket spending limit. What eventually matters is the actual amount of out-of-pocket 







APPROPRIATE PHYSICIAN PRESCRIBING  
 
Cross-border drug advertisements on US television have considerable spill-over effects in 
Canada due to proximity, often leading to the impression that drug advertising is legal in 
Canada.121 Owing to this cross-border effect, according to a somewhat dated opinion survey, 
approximately 53% of Canadians believe that prescription drug advertising is legal, even though 
it is restricted by the FDA.122 In Canada, many believe Direct-to-Consumer-Advertising (DTCA) 
to be permitted and some criticize the restrictions on DTCA as remaining ineffective. The spill-
over of US drug advertisements compromises the federal government’s objective to protect 
Canadians. US FDA does not require pre-clearance of drug advertisements, leaving them 
unregulated.123  
 Even if advertising prescription drugs directly to the public is prohibited in Canada, as in 
most countries a shift in interpretation of the policy, known as direct-to-consumer advertising 
(DTCA), has nevertheless occurred in Canada, resulting in its partial introduction without public 
and parliamentary debate. Consultations on the potential introduction of DTCA have been held by 
Health Canada since 1996, but there has been little interest in allowing DTCA from health 
professional and consumer organizations or provincial governments. Despite this, some forms of 
advertising of prescription drugs to consumers have become widespread.124  
 
121  Mintzes, B., ‘What are the Public Health Implications? Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of 
Prescription Drugs in Canada’ (Toronto: Health Council of Canada, 2006) p.8; cited: Chow, E.C., 
‘Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Pharmaceuticals on Television: A Charter Challenge,’ 
Canadian Journal of Law and Technology, vol. 9 (2011), p.76. 
122  “Ipsos-Reid Survey Shows Strong Public Support for Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of 
Prescription Medications”, Canada News Wire, News Release (31 January 2002); cited: Chow, 
ibid. 
123  Ibid. 
124  Gardner, D.M., et al., ‘Direct-to-consumer prescription drug advertising in Canada: Permission by 




Surmising about the role the proposed national drug agency, several respondents in my 
study expressed concerns over the agency’s independence and integrity. Would the officials 
running such a national agency be immune from the courting by pharmaceutical companies? What 
measures should the government take to ensure the integrity of the independent agency? One of 
my respondents wrote: “I also question the independence of the national agency, knowing that 
patient groups have often been courted by pharmaceutical companies even through direct 
funding. How can the government ensure that this agency is not captured?” –(R001)125  
Pharmaceutical firms attempt to bias physicians in many ways. That they often invite 
prescribing doctors to the expensive vacation trips and other inducements are well-known, thanks 
to investigative journalism.126 No less conspicuous are small but carefully crafted day-to-day 
interactions. The pharmaceutical industry holds on to Canada’s healthcare system — swaying 
doctors’ opinions, funding medical schools and, ultimately, affecting the type of drugs we are 
prescribed by all of these means.127 
Physicians face financial pressure to prescribe pharmaceutical manufacturers’ expensive 
new drugs even when cheaper drugs may be at least as effective are available. Besides emotional 
or social pressure distorting a doctor's judgment, free gifts and subtle economic incentives also are 
at work to bias them, according to many studies on the interactions between doctors and drug 
company representatives. In 2004, pharmaceutical companies in the US spent an average of 
$10,000 per practicing physician on free meals, free continuing medical education (CME) training, 
free trips to conferences, and payments for various services, according to data compiled by the 
monitoring company ‘IMS Health’. Those drug representatives also gave the average doctor an 
 
125  See this thesis, infra. Ch 5, Sect. 5.6. Another respondent (R002), also thinks that an independent 
agency may be susceptible to be corrupted by drug companies: “Such an agency would be prone 
to economic failure far worse than any ‘market failure’, not to mention the risks of corruption.”  
126          Hensley, L. and J. Geerster, “‘Manipulating physicians’: How drug reps pitch your docs,” Global 
News, August 5,2019; https://globalnews.ca/news/5702980/how-drug-reps-pitch-doctors/ 





extra $21,000 in free drug samples. The total 2004 tab for drug representative strategies: $23.7 
billion. This is two times as much as drug manufacturers spent influencing physicians in 1998.128 
A survey of nearly 3,200 US physicians in 6 specialties (New England Journal of Medicine) 
found this fact of financial pressure verified. The study showed that drug companies’ influence is 
more ubiquitous than previous studies had found. 94% of the family practitioners, internists, 
pediatricians, cardiologists, general surgeons, and anesthesiologists surveyed said they accepted 
drug company money or gifts. Of those, 83% accepted free food, and 78% accepted free drugs. 
35% accepted reimbursements for the cost of conferences or CME, and 28% took money for 
consulting, giving speeches to persuade other doctors to use companies’ drugs, or steering their 
patients into companies’ clinical trials.129 A study in 2000 (Journal of the American Medical 
Association) reported that from 1982 through 1997, 16 surveys of doctors from a variety of specialties 
showed that drug company representatives visited them an average of 4.4 times per month. By 
early 2004, as the New England Journal of Medicine survey found it, company representatives were 
visiting family practitioners 16 times a month, internists 10 times a month, cardiologists 9 times a 
month, and pediatricians 8 times (the study did not look at meetings with oncologists). They can visit 
that often because an army of approximately 100,000 drug industry representatives work to influence 
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